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2 I, ELBERT BOWERS, declare: 
3 
4 
Background and Work History 
5 
6 
l. I have been involved in the occupational radiation-safety industry since 1978. My 
7 experience within the industry has been diverse and I have been assigned to many worksites, 
8 including Department of Energy facilities, commercial nuclear power plants, and regulated 
9 
environmental remediation and reclamation projects. I started at the Oconee Nuclear Power 
10 
11 
Station as a trainee. I completed Health Physics trainee "entry level" screening. This consisted of 
12 Health Physics fundamentals and classwork that lasted approximately six months. It was 
13 followed by in-depth Health Physics theory addressing, in part, ionizing radiation - its detection, 
14 
sources and corresponding effects involving exposure to the living cell (i.e., biologicallisk). This 
15 
training was supplemented with hands-on "in-field" exercises and additional follow-up classes 
1 6 
1 7 
within regular six-month intervals. 











approximately four years. During that time, I also became ANSI 3 .1-qualified. In April 1988, I 
gained instructor certification through the Institute ofNuclear Power Operations (INPO) to 
implement all aspects of Occupational Radiation Safety training programs. I gained similar 
certification to implement like programs at U.S. Department of Energy facilities in November 
1995, while assigned to the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (RFETS). 
3. In addition to the aforementioned places I have worked, other tenures involving 
radiological work included assignments at: the Indian Point Nuclear power plant in Buchanan, 
New York; the Babcock & Wilcox nuclear fuel production facility in Lynchburg, Virginia; 
2 
Declaration of El bert Bowers 
~
1 Hartley & Hartley Landfill, Kawkawlin, Michigan; Grissom Air Force Base, Indianapolis, 
2 
Indiana; Shapack Landfill, Attleboro Massachusetts; and Warren Peak Air Force Weather Statio 
3 
in Sundance Wyoming. Subsequently I worked at several places for New World Technology 
4 
5 
("NWT"), a radiological safety staffing firm. (At that time, New World Environmental ["NWE"] 
6 was doing business under its corporate name, "New World Technology.") I worked for NWT in 
7 radiological roles at: Pickatinny Arsenal in New Jersey; China Lake Naval Air Station in 
8 
Ridgecrest, California; and at Hw1ter Point Naval Shipyard ("HPNS") in San Francisco, 
9 
10 
California. After leaving NWT, I was employed by Tetra Tech EC at HPNS and finished that 
11 employment in a radiological role while assigned at Naval Air Station Alameda in Alameda, 
12 California. 
13 
4. I started working for NWT at HPNS in January 2001 and became the company's 
14 
Radiation Safety Officer Representative ("RSOR") in January 2004. I worked in that capacity for 
15 
16 
approximately three and one-third years. Then, on March 30, 2009, after Tetra Tech EC invoked 
17 first time use of its own NRC materials license and ceased the conduct of operations under 
18 NWT's license, I "rolled over" - with endorsement by Navy Radiological Affairs Support Office 
19 
("RASO") Lead Environmental Program Manager, Laurie Lowman- from working for NWT to 
20 
21 
working for Tetra Tech EC directly as RSOR (with technical accoWltability to Mr. Clifford 
22 Stephan, Tetra Tech EC's License Radiation Safety Officer). 
23 5. During my first week with Tetra Tech EC as the RSOR at HPNS, Mr. Stephan left the 
24 company after which I asswned the dual role of Tetra Tech EC License RSO (with technical 
25 
accountability to Mr. Philip Bartley, Tetra Tech EC Vice President, Environmental Safety and 
26 
27 
Quality Services). In accordance with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) mandated 
28 approval protocol, my assignment as Tetra Tech EC License RSO was reflected on the 
3 
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1 company's amended NRC license dated July 27, 2009 (designation as the company License RSO 
2 
remained in effect through December 2009, the same approximate time Mr. Bartley's Tetra Tech 
3 
EC tenure ended). I held the Tetra Tech EC RSOR position at HPNS for approximately eighteen 
4 
5 
months. I had prior experience as an RSOR at the high profile Superfund site of Shapack 
6 Landfill, Attleboro Massachusetts, and the Hartley and Hartley Landfill, Kawkawlin Township, 
7 Michigan. My responsibilities as RSOR at these sites included the accommodation of announced 
8 
and unannounced NRC inspections as well as overseeing radiological activities at the projects to 
9 
10 
ensure uninterrupted licensee compliance with NRC mandated regulations, thus ensuring work 
11 was performed in a way that validated safe operations and ensuring the health and safety of the 
12 project staff, the general public and the environment. 
13 6. During the time I worked at Hunters Point Shipyard I had multiple concerns pertinent to 
14 
radiological safety. They included safety oriented concerns centered around: Tetra Tech EC's 
15 
16 
ever worsening "production over safety" work culture; willful use and retention of unqualified 
17 and/or under-qualified workers; improper use of the Portal Monitor; and numerous incidents 
18 where I became aware that NRC license compliance was, at the very least, compromised and 
19 
potentially violated. I have since learned to my dismay that the concerns I had were but the "tip 
20 
21 
of the iceberg" for I was not aware of the rampant radiological frauds that were being directed by 
22 the Tetra Tech EC management and supervisors with whom I worked. 
23 
24 Tetra Tech EC's Work Culture 
25 
7. My most serious concern that I had while working at Hunters Point with RAD work 
26 
27 
practices involved the work culture of key construction oriented Tetra Tech EC "decision 
28 makers" - persons in upper level project management roles at HPNS. In order to comply with 
4 
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1 NRC Form 3 and Materials License mandates, I found myself routinely obligated in ever 
2 
increasing frequency to bring concerns about RAD safety shortcomings to Tetra Tech EC's top 
3 
on-site managers, William "Bill" Dougherty, the Construction Project Manager, and Dennis 
4 
5 
McWade, the Construction Project Superintendent. However, over the course of my 
6 employment tenure under Tetra Tech EC, both Dougherty and McWade demonstrated a "profit 
7 driven production first" mentality adversely impacting, with increasing frequency, almost evety 
8 
radiologically-oriented project operation at the expense of basic radiological safety. I initially 
9 
10 
thought that these Tetra Tech managers simply displayed radiological incompetence which firm 
11 and assertive cmTective actions on my part would easily correct. Instead, over the course of my 
12 last months as a Tetra Tech EC Hunters Point employee, I became more and more convinced that 
13 
the underlying "envisioned" production needs of the Construction Department overrode proper 
14 
radiological practices. The Construction Department for Tetra Tech EC viewed NRC regulated 
15 
16 
requirements and the HPs who enforced them as impediments to production at Hunters Point. 
17 Dougherty and McWade didn' t respect the HPs professional responsibilities or authority. I 
18 observed that the example of Dougherty and McWade created an unhealthy "trickle down" effect 
19 
as to how other Construction Department staff treated HPs in the field. I was aware that HP' s 
20 
21 
were instructed to speed up work in order to meet production schedules or otherwise be viewed 
22 as willfully contributing to project cost overruns and subject to threat of termination. 
23 8. Tetra Tech EC's poor safety culture was further enabled by dictating the preferential hire 
24 of unqualified HPs, as further detailed below, who were pliable and willing to be coerced into 
25 
doing - right or wrong - what the Construction Department dictated as opposed to standing up to 
26 
27 
them and insisting that all rad work be done compliantly and in accordance with Tetra Tech EC' s 
28 
5 
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1 NRC issued license and supporting project RAD safety procedures, despite any potential delays 
2 in production. 
3 
9. Also as a result of Dougherty and McWade's attitude was a gradually implemented 
4 
5 
culture of deception. I didn't know it at the time, but I have since been informed by former HPs 
6 at Hunters Point that the Tetra Tech EC HP supervisors had an "early warning system," under 
7 which they were alerted when I would leave my office and go out to the field. Thus alerted, the 
8 
supervisors, in particular Justin Hubbard and Stephen Rolfe, insured non-compliance and 
9 
10 
obvious cheating on rad practices ceased, at least until I went back to my office. 
11 10. In addition to the early warning system, 1 discovered during the last few months of my 
12 Hunters Point tenure that the Construction Department kept me "out of the loop" of some of the 
13 
places and times RAD work was being done. This was occuning despite the fact that, to ensure 
1 4 
the safe and compliant conduct of all RAD work performed under Tetra Tech EC's NRC license, 
15 
16 
communication to me or my designee of such planned work was first required. As further 
17 described below, I only discovered such work was taking place by conducting RAD-safety 
18 integrity checks throughout the shipyard at various times of the day, including after-hours. I 
1 9 




22 11. Looking back, I realize that safety culture expectations suffered when the nature of Tetra 
23 Tech EC's contract with the Navy changed. The contract transitioned from a time-and-materials 
24 contract to one with a firm fixed-price in 2009. See, Attachment 1, as an example of the finn 
25 
fixed-price contract formats that were used from 2009 on, a June 24, 2011 Scope of Work 
26 
27 
Contract issued by the Navy. Under the time-and-materials contract, there was no financial 
28 incentive to cut corners as Tetra Tech EC was paid for its actual costs plus a percentage for 
6 
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1 profit. However, under the firm fixed-price contract, there was an incentive to cut corners; profit 
2 was maximized by cutting costs, speeding up production, and finishing up as far ahead of 
3 
schedule as possible. So, for example, costs were cut by laying off HPs. In fact, after the firm 
4 
5 
fixed-price contract model was instituted, 2 of the 3 HP slots that were designated to report to me 
6 for miscellaneous "Basewide" support purposes (i.e. NRC license compliance oriented 
7 confmnatory surveys of all Radiologically Controlled Areas not actively worked, 
8 
incoming/outgoing Portal Monitor surveys, etc.) were eliminated beginning in January 2011. 
9 
10 
12. Costs could also have been more substantially cut by cheating on various RAD 
11 remediation processes. I was not aware of the RAD fraud at the time. I have learned from the 
12 Investigation Conclusion Anomalous Soil Samples at Hunters Point Naval Shipyard report, as 
13 
well as the admissions by Anthony Smith and others, that widespread fraudulent cheating on soil 
14 
samples, scanning, and remediation was done. This scheme of RAD fraud dramatically reduced 
15 
16 
costs to Tetra Tech, increased the profits to Tetra Tech, and potentially allowed RAD 
17 contamination above release criteria to remain on Hunters Point and to be shipped off Hunters 





13. After the contract changed, I noticed more frequent RAD-oriented discrepancies, going at 
22 first from one incident every 6 weeks or so that I discovered, to one every 2 weeks, to upwards 
23 of one or more a week. I have since learned after my removal from Hunters Point that dramatic 
24 and systematic RAD frauds were engaged in that were kept secret from me by Tetra Tech EC 
25 
management and others. 
26 
27 
14. The incentives that accompanied initiation of the firm fixed-price contracting model 
28 explain, in large degree, the deterioration of Tetra Tech EC's safety culture and the 
7 





























accompanying RAD fraud. Based on my experience, following proper radiological procedures 
often results in production delays (e.g., a series of excavation steps that typically take 15 minutes 
for a heavy equipment operator to complete may, instead, take upwards of 45 minutes for the 
same steps if subject to radiological controls due to the plethora of monitoring intervals expected 
of HP safety personnel). 
15. Eventually, after months of escalating "cooperative teamwork" difficulties with Tetra 
Tech EC's on-site construction management, I felt overarching pressure by Bill Dougherty, the 
Tetra Tech EC Construction Project Manager to "look the other way"- even though ever more 
bizarre RAD safety irregularities persisted. The situation reached its peak for me on the morning 
of January 13, 2011 when Dougherty angrily threatened to have my name "removed" from the 
license, then - in what remains the one and only such scenario of its kind encountered in my 30 
plus year professional career- followed up with shouted demands that T immediately remove 
myself from the project along with my personal belongings. This was the treatment I endured 
while adhering to the federally protected obligations and mandates ofNRC Form 3. I was trying 
to apprise Dougherty of the most recently-discovered compliance concerns of adverse impact to 
Tetra Tech EC's NRC license. 
Tetra Tech Did Not Correct RAD Fraud That Resulted In Release Of RAD 
Contaminated Soil To The Public 
16. When I began working at Hunters Point in 2001, and for some years thereafter, a major 
focus ofNavy radiological cleanup protocol and the work of Tetra Tech- referred to as 
"characterization" or "investigative" assessments - was to survey buildings and areas of Hunters 
Point to try and determine whether an area or building was "impacted" (meaning elevated 
8 
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1 readings of the building or area confirmed the probable presence of radiological contamination 
2 
above release criteria levels established by the Navy and regulators). Because buildings and 
3 
structures were the primary focus ofNavy contract awards in the early years, there was not yet a 
4 
5 
significant priority at that time placed on extracting contaminated soils from Hunters Point and 
6 remediating that soil (e.g., pursuing efforts to remove the radiological contamination from the 





17. In the mid-2000's, the Navy began to release contract awards for work to assess 
11 potentially RAD contaminated soil impacted areas of the shipyard, and remediate any 
12 radiologically contaminated soil where confirmed to exist. One process used for the purpose of 
13 
soil remediation at Hunters Point in 2006 involved the staging and use of conveyor belt 
14 
hardware. Working under two separate Navy awards, extracted soils originating from the 
15 
16 
Hunters Point Installation Removal- 02 (aka: "IR-02") and the PCB Hot Spot areas of Parcel E 
17 were staged to go through conveyor belt systems. Strategically positioned directly above each 
18 conveyor belt was a set of twelve radiation detectors that were connected to a computer system. 
19 
Each computer was equipped with software featuring real-time RAD count rate detection 
20 
21 
displays and corresponding alarm indicators to alert system operators of RAD-elevated 
22 anomalies and RAD contamination when present. The soil to be processed was to be verified as 
23 non-saturated (from rain, etc.) and placed on the conveyor belt at a thickness of no more than 6 
24 
inches. The soil was then to be moved at a slow, established monitoring rate, under the radiation 
25 
detectors. If the detectors sensed RAD-elevated anomalies, i.e. radiological contamination, 
26 
27 
above a naturally occurring "background" radiation intensity level, the sensors triggered an 
28 alarm. Once the alarm was sounded the conveyor belt was to stop. A manual survey of the soil 
9 
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1 was to then be performed and the contaminated soi l was to be removed from the belt and placed 
2 
in low level radioactive waste containers. Containers in which rejected soi ls were placed would 
3 
then be securely staged until arrangements were in place for a low level radioactive waste 
4 
5 
shipment from Hunters Point to one of the four federally approved low level radioactive waste 
6 disposal sites in the United States. 
7 18. The soil from Parcel E that was being processed by the conveyor belt systems at that time 
8 
also had other forms of contamination, such as oi Is and PCBs. Because of the parallel existence 
9 
10 
ofnon-RAD oriented contaminants, waste soil that was cleared ofRAD concerns was to be 
11 shipped off Hunters Point to third parties that receive such chemically impacted soils. Although 
12 NWT and Tetra Tech were not the shippers of that soil, I understand that the final disposition of 
13 waste soil designated as non-RAD that was shipped off Hunters Point generally involved 
14 
disposal nearby in Northern California. 
15 
16 
19. Tetra Tech, as the construction company, had control over the conveyor belt system for it 
17 was considered construction based equipment. NWE RAD HPs were not permitted to change, 
1 8 adjust, or handle the conveyor belt processes. In particular, NWE RAD HPs were not permitted 
1 9 
to adjust the conveyor belt speed. The conveyor belt speed was controlled by Tetra Tech EC 
20 
21 
management. There was no standard operating procedure of set frequency to check the belt 
22 speed, or any directives to check the belt speed at all. NWE HPs did have authority over the 
23 radiation detectors and the alarm used in the conveyor belt system for those sensors and the 
2 4 alarm specifically related to remediation ofthe RAD waste. 
25 
20. For months in 2005 and 2006 the conveyor belt systems ran processing thousands of 
26 
27 
cubic yards of soil, but early in the process a substantial amount of the soil was pulled as having 
28 excessively high radioactive content, and was segregated and disposed of as low level 
10 
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1 radioactive waste. Due to the employee time and costs related to the identification and removal 
2 
of the radioactive contaminated soil through the conveyor belt system, I contacted Ulrika 
3 
Messer, a Tetra Tech EC manager in San Diego who was responsible for the conveyor belt 
4 
5 
processing and this specific contract for Tetra Tech EC under Tetra Tech EC Vice President Neil 
6 Hart. I called Ulrika Messer and stated that NWE had incurred costs that equaled about 80% of 
7 the total contract allotment because of the labor time and associated expenses due to the large 
8 
amount of radioactive waste that was identified and removed through the conveyor belts systems. 
9 
10 
Ms. Messer screamed at me over the phone that these costs were a very serious problem for Tetr 
11 Tech EC, and that she would have to get on her hands and knees and "crawl to (Tetra Tech VP) 
12 Neil Hart begging for more money", or words to that effect. 
13 
21. I have learned through discussions with HPs, including Anthony Smith, that after I 
14 
informed Ms. Messer that the soil processing through the PCB Hot Spot conveyor belt system 
15 
16 
was exhausting the funds budgeted for her project, that efforts were taken to cheat so as to 
17 increase production and decrease identification and remediation of radiological contamination in 
18 the soil. Mr. Smith informed me that Joe Levell, a Tetra Tech supervisor, substantially increased 
19 
the speeds of the conveyor belts, which, in turn, compromised the previously established 
20 
21 
monitoring accuracy ofthe corresponding RAD detector sensors. I know that Joe Levell was a 
22 Tetra Tech EC employee who reported directly to Ms. Messer as her field lead at Hunters Point. 
23 Manipulating conveyor belt controls - including that for belt speed, was something that only a 
24 
Tetra Tech EC manager was permitted to authorize, and NWE was barred from making such 
25 
adjustments - including the belt speeds. 
26 
27 
22. In approximately July of 2006, HPs, who I think were Billy van Vo, Jack Schelebo, 
28 Emmitt Brown, Ray Roberson, and possibly others who worked in that operation, reported to 
11 
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1 New World management that the conveyor belt systems were not being operated properly. 
2 During my tenure at the shipyard in July and August of2006, I saw memos from Tetra Tech EC 
3 
managers that stated that the belts had been run at twice the approved speeds. (See attachment 2, 
4 
5 
the August 23, 2006 email from Ulrika Messer of Tetra Tech EC to Mike Wilson, the CEO of 
6 New World, aka NWE.) In later discussions with some of the employees who worked in the field 
7 who knew how the belts operated, I was inf01med that the belt speeds were increased between a 
8 
factor of six to nine times the approved speed. In my training and experience involving these 
9 
10 
types of radiation detectors, it is common knowledge that the detectors become much less 
11 effective when the scan speeds are increased. Based on my experience and knowledge, I would 
12 estimate that the radiation detection sensors would be nearly worthless to detect all but extreme 
13 
radiation emissions at such high speed scan rates. The radiation detectors at these speeds would 
14 
not be able to detect and alarm for radioactive contamination at the health and radiation safety 
15 
16 
criteria that the Navy and regulators had set for Hunters Point. 
17 23. In the time I worked at Hunters Point I learned in and around July and August of2006 
18 that individuals, including Senior HP Gary Wilson (who had recently been promoted into a 
19 
supervisory role), were also involved in actions to intentionally cripple the conveyor belt 
20 
21 
system's ability to detect radiation. I was informed by New World project manager Dan 
22 Spicuzza that Gary Wilson, who is the brother ofNWT CEO Mike Wilson, had silenced the 
23 radiation detector alarm on the PCB Hot Spot conveyor belt system. Mr. Spicuzza told me that 
24 Gary Wilson had stated when questioned, that Wilson had silenced the alarms because the alarms 
25 
were going off so much that all the soil was being treated as radiologically "crapped up" and 
26 
27 
there was way too much down time (or words to that effect). Having a large amount of the 
28 processed soil deemed radiologically contaminated slowed the process down, and dramatically 
12 
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1 increased the costs due to the steps necessary to segregate, containerize, and prepare for 
2 shipment the soil deemed low level radioactive waste. 1 understood from the discussions that 
3 
Gary Wilson had felt pressure from Tetra Tech management to reduce the amount of soil that 
4 
5 
was removed as radioactive contamination in order to reduce costs and increase the clearance of 
6 soil as "clean" soil, and Wilson silenced the alarms as a result of that pressure from Tetra Tech. I 
7 now can only wonder ifUlrika Messer of Tetra Tech (again, the person who became so 
8 
uncontrollably enraged when 1 advised her that the PCB Hot Spot budget had dwindled to a 20% 
9 
10 
reserve) vented as well to NWE CEO Mike Wilson (the brother of PCB Hot Spot RAD 
11 supervisor Gary Wilson), and intimidated CEO Wilson into persuading his brother Gary to 
12 increase PCB Hot Spot production using whatever means necessary. I am aware that Gary 
13 
Wilson was subjected to some form of discipline for his actions in August of 2006, but he was 
14 
not fired for that cheating. Months later Gary Wilson was let go because he had serious 
15 
16 
attendance and related problems. I am not aware that Joe Levell was disciplined by Tetra Tech 
17 EC at all for his deceptive act of drastically increasing the PCB Hot Spot conveyor belt speed. 
18 24. 
19 
In August of2006, l was informed and received emails that showed Tetra Tech VP Neil 
Hrut was overseeing the response to the disclosure that Joe Levell and Gary Wilson had taken 
20 
21 
actions that made the conveyor belt system a fraud and ineffective in properly screening soil for 
22 radioactive contamination. Ms. Messer advised through e-mails and related communications that 
23 the VP Neil Hrut was checking on the processes that were taken to screen the thousands of cubic 
24 yards of soil that had had been falsely screened by the conveyor belt system. I was aware that 
25 
Justin Hubbard was put in charge of supervising the processing of the soil that had been 
26 
27 
fraudulently processed through the conveyor belt system. See, Attachment 2. I have learned 
28 over time after my Hunters Point tenure that Justin Hubbard was actively involved in a pattern of 
13 
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1 cheating during the radiological remediation of soil and buildings that ensued. I know of no 
2 steps taken by VP Neil Hart to have the third parties warned that the thousands of cubic yards of 
3 
soil they received had been falsely screened by the conveyor belt system and were potentially 
4 
5 
contaminated with hazardous levels of radiological contamination. If Tetra Tech had wanted to 
6 give such warnings I would have to have been involved and informed due to the radiological 
7 nature of the problem. I believe Tetra Tech top management determined not to inform third 
8 
parties and the government bodies to avoid having to redress the potential major health hazard 
9 
10 
the company had created by the release of radiologically contaminated soil into the public. In the 
11 five years following the discovery of the false conveyor belt scanning in July of2006 while I 
12 worked at Hunters Point, I never leamed of any information that Tetra Tech EC management 
13 
changed its decision to hide the improper shipment of radioactive contaminated soil into the 
14 
public. I am not aware of any information to date that Tetra Tech EC, the Navy, or any of the 
15 
16 
regulators have alerted the third parties, which may include towns, cities, and counties that 
17 received this soil, of the radiological health and safety hazard of that soiL 
18 
19 
Unqualified workers/willful submittal of fraudulent qualifications by staff 
20 
21 
25. Another of my concems centered on conformance with expected worker qualification as 
22 required by the Navy in order to work at Hunters Point as an HP. One stark example of someone 
23 in conflict with the Navy's expectation was Jane Taylor. 
24 26. When a resume was submitted on behalf of someone interested in filling a vacant HP slot 
25 
at Hunters Point, he or she was required to meet a minimum standard of qualification as 
26 
27 
contractually detailed in the agreement with the Navy. For the agreement between the Navy and 
28 Tetra Tech, for one to be considered for a junior HP role, a candidate had to have a minimum of 
14 
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1 one year's experience in radiological remediation and safety prior to arriving at Hunters Point, 
2 
while a senior HP candidate must have had a minimum of3 years' experience. As for both junior 
3 
and senior HPs, the Navy required that minimum experience levels had to comply with ANSI 
4 
5 
Standard 3.1. The ANSI 3.1 standard is based primarily on desired '·skill set" driven experience 
6 that would involve extensive work experience in the radiological remediation and safety field. 
7 27. In addition to the contract requirements, I expected from my prior industry experience 
8 
that some form of RAD "fundamentals specific'' screening examination would be required to 
9 
10 
assess and document the baseline knowledge and skill sets of junior and senior HP candidates 
11 prior to hiring. However, I found that this was not the expectation for new hires at Hunters Point 
12 that were to work on behalf of Tetra Tech EC. 
13 28. Over the course of my professional career as both a RAD supervisor and Radiation Safet 
14 
Officer Representative, I participated in reviewing the qualifications of potential new hires, but 
15 
16 
at Hunters Point my review of qualifications and influence in the hiring decisions were at times 
17 limited. Normally, I reviewed resumes at Hunters Point in conjunction with Mr. Bill Haney, my 





29. In February 2006, I received a copy of a resume for Jane Taylor from the NWT Human 
22 Resources Director, Kari Guidry. Upon reviewing it, I had serious doubts as to the veracity of the 
23 resume. Listed as Jane Taylor's only radiologically oriented tenure was prior experience as a 
24 senior HP with a company named "Taylor Made Construction." Taylor did not list any 
25 
employment as a junior HP. Nor did her resume indicate that she was ANSI 3.1 qualified. From 
26 
27 
my prior job searches and my experience in the industry reviewing resumes and confirming 
28 qualification credentials, I was very familiar with the relatively limited number of companies tha 
1 5 
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1 specialized in RAD safety support services that would use HPs. I had never heard of Taylor 
2 
Made Construction in the field, which raised an immediate red flag in my mind. I promptly 
3 
shared my doubts on the authenticity of the resume by phone with Ms. Guidry. She abruptly said: 
4 
5 
"I'm H.R., you' re project management. l'11 do my job and you do yours - ifl need your help I ' ll 
6 ask for it" , or words to that effect. Despite my doubts about Jane Taylor' s qualifications, which I 
7 attempted to address, Guidry told me that she still intended to hire Jane Taylor. I told Bill Haney 
8 
about this conversation by phone and he told me "Put her somewhere with a senior where she 
9 
1 0 
can' t hurt us, and keep an eye on her," or words to that effect. I tried to follow this direction and 
11 my own belief that Taylor was not qualified. However, in the later years due to Taylor's personal 
12 relationship with Tetra Tech EC Construction Superintendent Dennis McWade, I could no lange 
13 control the assignments of Taylor and she received special treatment by Tetra Tech management 
1 4 
outside of my control. 
15 
16 
30. Jane Taylor was hired by New World Environmental on March 1, 2006 as a junior HP 
17 despite the doubts about her resume and her apparent lack of any legitimate prior RAD-oriented 
18 qualification- ANSI 3.1 or otherwise. In May 2006. less than three months into Taylor' s initial 
1 9 
Hunters Point tenure, Ms. Guidry informed me to my surprise that she was promoting Taylor 
20 
2 1 
into a vacant senior HP position which had opened at Hunters Point. 
22 31. On May 19, 2006, within a week of Taylor's promotion to the senior HP classification 
23 (and subsequent to being announced to the project staff), senior HP Richard Stoney stopped by 
24 my office and - obviously upset- tendered his immediate resignation. Upon attempting to 
2 5 
identify the bases of what appeared an abrupt, emotionally driven decision, Stoney explained 
26 
27 
with words to the effect that "in good conscience", he could not "work alongside Jane Taylor" 
28 now that she was being placed "in a senior HP role" because he knew she didn't have "junior or 
16 
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1 senior HP qualifications" and that "the resume she submitted to New World was faked by 
2 
Samantha" (Samantha Taylor, Jane Taylor's daughter). I asked Mr. Stoney if, instead of 
3 
resigning, would he be willing to discuss what he knew with Guidry. Still intent on irrunediately 
4 
5 
resigning, Stoney indicated that he couldn't imagine "anything productive that could come from 
6 that," or words to that effect. I then asked Stoney if he understood I had an obligation to convey 
7 to corporate Human Resources what he had conveyed to me, after which Stoney acknowledged 
8 
that he was. Stoney permanently left the project that same day, and T relayed what had happened 
9 
10 
by phone to both Guidry and Haney. T wondered why Taylor had been promoted and so quickly 
11 for she did not have the background, training, and experience- and nothing she did while 
12 employed contradicted that she was a fraud. I heard from others over time that Ms. Taylor was 
13 
involved in sexual relations with superiors at Hunters Point that might explain the favored 
14 
treatment she received. 
15 
16 
32. As her presence at Hunters Point proceeded, I heard from another senior HP, Arthur Jahr, 
17 in the presence ofNew World HR Director Kari Guidry, that it did not appear Taylor knew what 
18 she was doing. For example, we were told she did not know how to use RAD scanning 
19 
equipment properly, a skill any HP would be expected to have. 
20 
21 
33. On October 10, 2008, Taylor left Hunter Point Shipyard. She sought to return to work at 
22 Hunters Point in January of 2009. My understanding was that she left Hunters Point to seek 
23 work at the U.S. Department of Energy's Oak Ridge Nuclear Facility (where RAD training 
24 department screening examinations are administered), but was unable to get a job there. As when 
25 
Taylor first arrived at Hunters Point, I did not feel she should be re-hired because she was a 
26 
27 
fraud. However, on January 15, 2009, I received a directive from Dennis McWade, Tetra Tech 
28 EC's Construction Superintendent, who told me that Taylor was going to be returning to work at 
17 
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1 Hunters Point and ordered me to have Taylor re-hired into a senior HP slot effective the 
2 
following Monday. Tetra Tech was the general contractor that retained NWT, the company I 
3 
worked for at the time. I stated to McWade that 1 would pass along his direction to New World 
4 
5 
HR to re-hire Taylor. Despite my personal thoughts about Taylor, her fraudulent resume, and the 
6 reports she did not know the job, I knew a precedent had already been set during her initial hire-
7 the precedent was confirmed when I informed my supervisor Bill Haney, who again advised to 
8 
"place her where she can't hurt us", or words to that effect. I was told that McWade previously 
9 
10 
had an ongoing sexual relationship with Taylor and personally witnessed that they appeared to b 
11 romantically attached. I suspected the sexual relationship was the primary reason he wanted 
12 Taylor rehired. I told McWade that there weren't any senior slots available but McWade told me 
13 again to call my supervisor and " that HR lady" and to make sure Taylor was re-hired effective 
14 
the following Monday and he would make sure there would be a senior slot opened for Taylor by 
15 
16 
that time. Despite my personal and professional reservations about Taylor's rehire, I passed 
17 along McWade's directive to my supervisor Bill Haney and New World 's HR Director, Kari 






The obvious favoritism shown Taylor through her hiring, promotion, and re-hire became 
22 a source of growing conflict among the HPs and Tetra Tech employees, and grew as 
23 Construction Superintendent Me Wade made the favoritism more obvious, such as when 
24 McWade arranged for delivery of a personal desk for Taylor next to McWade's in the 
25 
Construction Superintendent office. 
26 
2 7 
35. Upon Jane Taylor's re-hire in 2009, as the year went on I had less and less ability to have 
28 influence over where Taylor or anyone else on staff was assigned to work at Hunters Point. 
18 
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1 Specific to Taylor, all reporting HP supervisors- who likewise were aware of her fraudulent 
2 
qualifications- as well as her romantic c01mection to McWade, were asked to closely monitor 
3 
Taylor's activities and performance skills while in the field and, as was passed on by my 
4 
5 
supervisor Bill Haney, continue to use her in roles "where she can' t hurt us". 
6 36. In 2009 after I had rolled over from New World to Tetra Tech EC employment, my lead 
7 HP field supervisor, Adam Berry, informed me that Tetra Tech EC management, primarily 
8 
Dennis McWade, saw to it that Taylor was assigned to work overseeing all Radiological 
9 
10 
Screening Yard (RSY) activities. McWade did not first seek my concurrence before the 
11 assignment of Taylor, and as in previous instances involving Taylor's retention for rad safety 
12 work at Hunters Point, I was not in favor of this assignment and informed my- now Tetra Tech 
13 
EC direct report, License RSO Eric Abkemeier of Taylor' s rustory and the current situation 
14 
involving McWade' s action. I shared with Abkemeier the prior reports from the New World era 
15 
16 
that Taylor did not know how to read a Ludlum RAD survey meter and that having difficulty 
17 with this fundamental task could present serious consequences, as such skill sets are a central 
18 prerequisite in the conduct ofRSY work. Abkemeier advised that he would monitor and assess 
19 
the situation. I later learned from senior HPs Archie Jackson and Susan Andrews that during 
20 
21 
this time Tetra Tech management no longer required HPs to collect soil samples at the RSY yard 
22 that would be submitted to the lab, but instead, would rely heavily on unskilled laborers under 
23 Taylor's oversight to perform this role- an act concealed from me that was occurring without my 
24 knowledge or concurrence. 
25 
37. My concerns regarding whether the RSY soil pad work was properly being performed 
26 
27 
was increased due to the hiring of another individual that I believe was unqualified for the 
28 position, and hired for non-qualification reasons. In 2009, Tetra Tech EC hired Thorpe Q. 
19 
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1 Miller. I learned that I was to be the direct supervisor of Mr. Miller, but I had no involvement in 
2 
his hire, contrary to Tetra Tech EC procedures. Mr. Miller was hired and installed in the positio 
3 
of Radiological Data Analyst that oversaw the data system for the RSY soil pad processing. 
4 
5 
Miller's role included detailed work with extensive and sophisticated volumes ofrad survey data, 
6 and the development of maps from such data to, in part, identifY specific towed array rad scan 
7 locations for sample collection from soil pads presenting the highest probability of exhibiting 
8 
radioactive contaminants. From the knowledge I gained regarding Mr. Miller and the limited 
9 
10 
skill sets he possessed, I concluded that he did not have the education, training, or experience for 
11 the position he was hired into, nor for nearly any position at Hunters Point dealing with 
12 radiological remediation and safety. 
13 
38. I learned that Thorpe Miller was the son of Laurie Lowman, the Navy Radiological 
14 
Affairs Support Office, aka: "RASO," Lead Environmental Program Manager out of Yorktown, 
15 
16 
VA- the person responsible for oversight of the RAD work at Hunters Point. J was informed 
17 that Miller had been fired from his last job and possibly criminally charged for his conduct with 
18 his prior retail store employer, which I heard was Target Stores. I concluded from the lack of 
19 
education, experience, and training of Miller, and that he was the son of the key Navy 
20 
21 
representative overseeing the RAD related work of Tetra Tech at Hunters Point, that Miller was 
22 hired by Tetra Tech to curry favor with Navy RASO Lowman. 
23 39. Throughout the time I remained at Hunters Point, I believed that Tetra Tech took active 
24 steps to continue to curry favor with RASO Lowman. For example, at the end of2009 I was to 
25 
do the performance evaluation of Thorpe Miller. I received clear pressure from General 
26 
27 
Manager Bill Dougherty to give Miller a positive evaluation. Dougherty gave me a detailed 
28 language template stating the performance achievements I was to use for the annual review. Due 
20 
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1 to the pressure from Dougherty I gave Miller performance ratings what I considered to be more 
2 
than the most positive evaluation that his performance could have warranted, and 1 used the 
3 
template language that Dougherty had directed. When I submitted the evaluation of Thorpe 
4 
5 
Miller to Dougherty for approval Dougherty did not approve the evaluation but required upward 
6 adjustments throughout the rating so that Miller would receive a pay raise above what his 
7 performance warranted. I did not take steps to block the upward adjustment that Dougherty 
8 




11 40. A few months after the performance appraisal was done, Tetra Tech Vice President Andy 
12 Bolt let me and other managers of Tetra Tech know that management of other companies 
13 
working at Hunters Point or seeking work at Hunters Point raised objections to the Navy and to 
1 4 
Laurie Lowman of RASO that the hiring of Thorpe Miller created a conflict of interest and as a 
15 
1 6 
result Lowman, RASO and the Navy favored Tetra Tech due to the employment of Lowman's 
17 son by Tetra Tech. VP Bolt, along with Dougherty and the owners ofiO Environmental 
18 collaborated to have Miller formally "resign" from Tetra Tech, be "hired" and paid through IO 
1 9 
Environmental as an "employee" but perform the same work for Tetra Tech, at the same Tetra 
20 
21 
Tech work desk and office at Hunters Point, to hide the conflict of interest. The resignation from 
22 Tetra Tech and immediate hire of Miller by IO Environmental was all orchestrated by VP Bolt to 
23 continue to curry favor with RASO Lowman, but hide the obvious conflict of interest. VP Bolt 
24 
wrote in an e-mail of April 23, 2010 that "Thorpe's resignation removes that appearance of 
25 
conflict. Thorpe will be taking a job with another company, but will most likely be working as a 
26 
27 
subcontractor for us. This should provide enough layers that the appearance of a conflict is 
28 
21 
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1 removed, and will help out Laurie Lowman and us, both." I have attached a chain of emails 
2 related to the "resignation" that was orchestrated by Tetra Tech's VP Andy Bolt as Attachment 3. 
3 
41. Tetra Tech continued efforts to curry favor with RASO Lowman in how it treated her 
4 
5 
son. RASO Lowman knew of the health and safety risks to the workers in RAD areas at Hunters 
6 Point, knew her son did not have training or experience with radiological hazards, and she did 
7 not want to have her son, Thorpe Miller, allowed to go onto Radiologically Controlled Areas. 
8 
Miller was never issued a dosimeter badge that was required of anyone entering a RCA at 
9 
10 
Hunters Point. Nearly everyone working at Hunters Point other than secretarial staff were issued 
11 dosimeters for one reason or another as part of the job. Tetra Tech increased the efforts to curry 
12 favor with RASO Lowman by directing TO Environmental to not only hire Thorpe Miller, but to 
13 
also hire the wife of Miller, the daughter-in-law of RASO Lowman, as a full-time archeologist to 
14 
work at Hunters Point despite the fact that Hunters Point was virtually demolished and rebuilt 
15 
16 
during and post-World War II and as a result had little to no archeological importance. It was 
17 much more a standard practice for such projects with little obvious archeological importance for 
18 a company to contract with an archeologist to come on site if something was discovered during 
19 
the project, and not to hire a full time archeologist. 
20 
21 
42. I was concerned that the combination of having Jane Taylor, whose rad background was 
22 a fraud, in charge of the RSY pad surveys and processing, and Thorpe Miller, who had no 
23 relevant experience or training, put over the data from the towed array and maps used in the RSY 
24 pad work to obtain samples, would result in defective RSY remediation of radiological 
25 
contamination. However, due to the clear direction from Tetra Tech management that these two 
26 
27 
people were to do these important tasks. I, nor my direct report Eric Abkemeier, were able to 
28 block the assignments. It was reported to me over the following months in 20 10 and 2011 that 
22 
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1 soil that had been cleared of radiological contamination from the RSY pads were failing the 
2 portal monitor screening at increasing rates. 
3 
43. Soil that had some contamination other than radiological contaminants, such as oils, 
4 
5 
PCBs, or asbestos, once processed on the RSY pads and cleared, went through a portal monitor 
6 and was shipped off Hunters Point to third-pruties that would receive soil that did not have 
7 radiological contamination. Soil that did not have these other fom1s of contamination, once 
8 
processed through the RSY pad and the samples approved by the lab, were returned to Hunters 
9 
10 
Point and used as backfill for the trenches on site. It was much less expensive for Tetra Tech to 
11 have the soil falsely cleared for use as backfill, than to have the soil repeatedly subjected to 
12 remediation of radiological contamination, and the associated time and expense of separating the 
13 
non-impacted soil from portions with elevated radioactive contaminants that would have to be 
14 
shipped to a low level rad waste landfill. 
15 
16 
44. After Jane Taylor and Thorpe Miller were in positions of responsibility over the RSY pad 
17 processing, very, very hjgh percentages of the soil removed from Hunters Point were deemed 
18 "cleared" and used as backfill into the Hunters Point trenches. For example, attachments 4 and 5 
19 
to my declaration are e-mails of January 6, 2011 from Thorpe Miller. These e-mails show that a 
20 
21 
total of 1,023 cubic yards of soil were processed on the RSY pads from units 190 and 187 from 
22 Parcel UC3. The oversight of Taylor and Miller for the RSY pad processing resulted in only 10 
23 remediated cubic yards ofRAD contaminated soil, or less than .01% of the soil. Having such a 
24 low level of soil remediated was a substantial cost savings to Tetra Tech under the firm fixed 
25 
price contracts with the Navy. 
26 
27 
45. I have had concerns regarding the qualifications of Jane Taylor and Thorpe Miller to 
28 perform their roles regarding the RSY soil pad processing. I am concerned that due to a lack of 
23 
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1 training, experience, skill, and commitment by these individuals that significant amounts of the 
2 soil that was used as backfill at Hunters Point was not properly screened, sampled, and 
3 
remediated. I am concerned that there may be large amounts of soil used as back-fill at Hunters 
4 
5 
Point that did not meet the release criteria established by the Navy and regulators, and continues 
6 to have radiological contamination that poses a health hazard. 
7 46. My concerns that soils processed on the RSY pads after Tetra Tech had Jane Taylor, who 
8 
the company knew was a fraud and incompetent, and Thorpe Miller, who the company knew as 
9 
10 
unqualified and hired to compromise Navy oversight ofthe work, and unskilled laborers 
11 performing the soil sampling on the RSY pad, would result in hazardous radiological 
12 contamination remaining in the soil that was backfilled at Hunters Point was not an academic 
13 concern. I learned that highly radioactive contamination did remain in soil processed on the 
14 
RSY pad system that Tetra Tech "cleared" as free of radioactive contamination. For example, 
15 
16 
Billy van Vo had worked with NWE and had moved his employment over to Shaw 
17 Environmental, a company also performing some radiological remediation work at Hunters 
18 Point. I learned the following from Mr. Vo, and from others who learned of this situation but 
19 
kept it quiet. Mr. Vo was with a Shaw junior HP on Hunters Point. The junior HP asked Mr. Yo 
20 
21 
to show him how to work a radiological scanner in the field, which Mr. Vo had and was 
22 experienced to use. Mr. Vo showed the junior HP some of the basics in the use of a Ludlum 
23 radiological detection field instrument and let the junior HP give it a try in the field. Mr. Vo and 
24 the junior HP were in an area of Hunters Point that had been trenched, and remediated by Shaw 
25 
EnvironmentaL The soil that had been used to fill the trench was largely backfill that came from 
26 
27 
the Tetra Tech managed RSY pads that Jane Taylor, Thorpe Miller, and the unskilled laborers 
28 had processed. This soil, once "cleared" by the RSY processed lab samples simply goes back 
24 
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1 into the Hunters Point ground as backfill without any further check or scanning. The junior HP, 
2 while conducting a walk-over scan of the freshly placed trench backfill, observed that radiation 
3 
readings on his instrument had suddenly jumped off scale (aka "pegged out") due to the area 
4 
5 
radiation levels being so high. When further investigating the source of the high radioactivity, 
6 Mr. Vo and the junior HP discovered what proved to be an "old generation button" of the kind 
7 used by the military decades earlier throughout Hunters Point. Radiation emissions coming from 
8 
the button were so excessively high (in the milli-Rem per hour, aka mR/hr, range), that the 
9 
10 
Ludlum sensor being used was inappropriate for accurate measurement. A better, more 
11 specialized monitoring device had to be secured so precise assessment of the highly elevated 
12 readings could be gained. Radium 226 was the radioactive contaminant associated with the 
13 improperly discarded burton from years past that the RSY processing failed to remove as higWy 
14 
elevated radioactive waste. The NRC and EPA have long recognized that radium 226 has 
1 5 
16 
historically existed in soils and materials throughout the shipyard at Hunters Point due to actions 
17 by the Navy, and is the most common radioactive contaminant still being discovered during 
18 clean of Hunters Point. Radium 226 is also recognized by the International Commission on 
19 
Radiological Protection (ICRP headquartered in Ottowa, Canada) and the National Catmcil on 
20 
21 
Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP based in Bethesda, MD) as being of the "Very 
22 High Radiotoxicity" classification. The NRC and others specializing in this field know full well 
23 there is a distinct likelihood people can die of cancer from uncontrolled exposure to radium 226, 
2 4 as well as many of the other thirty-three radionuclide contaminants confirmed or expected by 
25 
the Navy to be present throughout Hunters Point. Blood and bone cancers lead the way as at least 
26 
27 
two of the distinct health hazards from exposure to radium 226. Young children, old people, and 
28 persons saddled with generally poor health are particularly susceptible to increased medical 
25 
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1 issues, complications, and even death due to exposure to radium 226. Human sensitivity factors 
2 
relate proportionally to radionuclide toxicity. Detrimental health effects can result if Hunters 
3 
Point radionuclides of concern are absorbed through the skin, inhaled, ingested, or introduced 
4 
5 
uncontrolled into the body by like means. Radium buttons of the type Mr. V o unexpectedly 
6 discovered, and other residual radium contaminants still present throughout the shipyard (e.g., 
7 radium that has leached from devices and I or flaked off from old, improperly discarded, 
8 
disintegrating buttons I deck markers as tiny but highly radioactive particles commingled in the 
9 
10 
Hunters Point soils) can very easily and unknowingly be absorbed, inhaled, ingested, etc if 
11 unknowingly gotten on ones hands, lips, nose, or mouth. I believe that Mr. Vo did not report this 
12 radium button incident to Shaw, the Navy or the NRC because he - like his co-workers - worried 
13 
that exposing the fraudulent remediation at Hunters Point would result in loss of employment. 
14 
47. I had concerns with other workers' qualifications as well. Bryan White, for example, 
15 
16 
originally was a New World Technology employee that Human Resources Director Kari Guidry 
17 retained based on his stated willingness to fill a junior HP position although, according to 
18 Guidry, White possessed Senior HP skills. Once provided the opportunity to review White' s 
19 
resume, in concert with my direct report, Bill Haney, no verifiable place of prior employment 
20 
21 
could be confirmed through which White's claimed RAD experience was gained. Despite my 
22 doubts about his work history, White was hired as a junior HP on May 27, 2008. As was the case 
23 with Jane Taylor's fast ascension from the junior to senior HP category, White was promoted to 
24 a senior HP position less than 12 weeks later, on August 11 , 2008. 
25 
48. Just before my Tetra Tech employment in March 2009- and without my involvement or 
26 
27 
input, White resigned his New World position on February 20, 2009 to immediately "roll-over" 
28 as a Tetra Tech EC hire. (White would later be assigned to my staff as a Tetra Tech EC 
26 
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1 employee with direction later given to me by Bill Dougherty that White would be the lead RAD 
2 HP supervisor). Bill Dougherty, Tetra Tech EC' s Construction Project Manager made the 
3 
decision to hire White and, contrary to license protocol, I was not consulted. As the designated 
4 
5 
Project RSO (and NRC license RSO at the time), I should have been consulted to check that his 
6 qualifications complied with Tetra Tech EC's minimum position-oriented requirements as well 
7 as those listed in the Navy contract. As the potential direct supervisor of White, company 
8 
procedures provided that I was to be involved in the hiring decision. Taking into consideration 
9 
1 0 
details from White's resume and prior experience, still not verifiable, I believed White was not 
11 qualified to adequately perform the level of RAD supervisory work expected of him, and I would 
1 2 not have given my approval to the hire and promotion of White to a RAD supervisor position for 
13 Tetra Tech at Hunters Point. 
14 
49. During the following months, the performance of Bryan White evidenced deficits in his 
15 
16 
skill, knowledge and abilities as a RAD supervisor. When annual performance reviews were to 
1 7 be done at the end of the year I was tasked with developing the performance review for the RAD 
18 supervisors, including White. When Bill Dougherty reviewed the draft performance evaluation I 
1 9 
did for White, Dougherty went to my computer and he personally changed the performance 
20 
21 
evaluation and ratings to significantly increase and improve the ratings for White. Bill 
22 Dougherty's changes to the performance appraisal were done to falsely depict the performance o 
23 White and to promote White upwards 2 full pay scales to the level experienced RAD supervisors 
2 4 were receiving at Tetra Tech EC. I did not agree with the conduct of Dougherty or the changes 
25 
he made to the performance evaluation of White. I discussed the circumstances with my Tetra 
26 
27 
Tech EC direct report, Eric Abkemeier, who finished White' s appraisal process in coordination 
2 8 with Dougherty (retaining the excessive performance ratings for White). D ougherty conveyed hi 
27 
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1 expectation as well that White be designated as acting project RSO representative when I was 
2 
away from Hunters Point - which I felt was contrary to White's lack of experience and 
3 
competence (an event during which Abkemeier's involvement also became necessary). 
4 
5 
50. I also had questions about the qualifications of Tina Rolfe, who was hired as a senior HP. 
6 She was married to Steve Rolfe, a senior HP and he was later a RAD-safety field supervisor for 
7 New World Environmental, then as a Tetra Tech EC employee (RAD safety field supervisor). I 
8 
believe Tina Rolfe was hired based on favouritism and her relationship with her husband, as well 
9 
10 
as the fact that her brother-in-Law Jeff Rolfe and his wife were also employed to work at Hunters 
11 Point. 
12 
13 Portal Monitor 
1 4 
51. The Navy required Tetra Tech EC to use a radiation-detection sensing Portal Monitor to 
15 
16 
screen vehicles designated for load carrying purposes (e.g., dump trucks, etc.) entering and 
17 leaving the shipyard to insure they were not can-ying radioactive contaminants onto, or off the 
18 facility. The Portal Monitor was equipped with an alarm that activated if the sensors detected 
19 
radiation at a level above the "natural background radiation" clearance standard. The procedure 
20 
21 
when a truck set off the alarm was to have the truck go through the Monitor again. If it failed two 
22 out of three passes, the truck's load was required to remain on the shjpyard for further 
23 investigation ofthe source of the radioactive contamination alatm. 
24 
52. A troubling event involving the Portal Monitor took place in early April2009, the first 
25 
week after I transitioned from employment as New World Environmental's RSO representative 
26 
27 
to becoming a Tetra Tech EC employee in the same RSO representative capacity. At the end of 
28 the day, management staff gathered in the project conference room- including Tetra Tech EC's 
28 
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1 HP supervisors (Adam BeiTy, Bryan White, Justin Hubbard, and Steve Rolfe) to conduct a 
2 debrief specific to the day's activities. After one of the daily debriefs, Adam BeiTy came to my 
3 
office looking very frustrated and wouied. He told me that Dennis McWade, Tetra Tech EC's 
4 
5 
Construction Superintendent, directed a truck to leave the shipyard despite having set off the 
6 Portal Monitor alann. Berry said that Me Wade told the responding HPs to stop surveying the 
7 truck and directed the driver to go ahead and leave the site, telling the HPs that it was the end of 
8 
the shift and he needed the driver to "get off the clock." 
9 
10 
53. Berry and I went to confront McWade. He was in Tetra Tech EC Construction Project 
11 Manager Bill Dougherty's office. McWade acknowledged that he'd allowed the truck to leave 
12 the shipyard. This was but one example of many instances in which I learned and observed that 
13 McWade took steps to have things done quickly and with less expense, with disregard for 
14 
radiological requirements and radiological safety. This was just one example of the Construction 
15 
16 
Department overriding proper radiological procedure in favor of a "production first" attitude. 
17 
18 Changing Analytical Results 
19 
54. A lab technician, Neil Berrett, and a lab supervisor, Phil Smith, came to me on separate 
20 
21 
occasions with both complaining they were being asked by upper level project management 
22 consultants to "write away" laboratory analysis results by changing the results of sample 
23 analyses. In both instances, I asked if, before coming to me, they had attempted to resolve the 
24 issue directly with the consultant in question and each said they had not. I advised them that 
25 
there were two options to achieve resolution. They could either pursue the matter directly with 
26 
27 
the consultant or all involved could meet with me to address the situation. Both chose not to have 
28 a meeting with all involved and myself In later casual conversation I asked about the situation 
29 
Declaration of Elbert Bowers 
~ 
1 and understood that the matter was resolved. I did not learn the specifics of what lab analysis or 
2 
data were written away or changes as they indicated. Since my termination from Tetra Tech, 
3 
however, I have learned of numerous instances in which lab results were ordered destroyed, and 
4 
5 
other improper lab related conduct. Incredibly, and on a personal level, I have also come to 
6 realize that employees who reported and resisted improper practices, including myself, were 
7 fired. I now wonder if these two individuals chose not to pursue correction of the lab issues they 
8 
raised in order to remain employed at Hunters Point. 
9 
10 
11 Concerns Raised During Field Safety Checks 
12 55. Part of my work as the Hunters Point project RSO representative (and, on occasion, 
13 
Tetra Tech EC's License RSO) was to do a daily field check to see if there was anythi11g going 
14 
on contrary to license compliance and to make sure all Radiologically Controlled Areas, or 
15 
16 
RCA's, were secure at the end of the day. During those field checks I noticed many times that 
17 license requirements were not respected - so much so in the months prior to me being removed 
18 from the project at Hunters Point, that I found myself constantly pondering why someone at my 
19 
level was discovering such obvious deficiencies that should have been caught/corrected well in 
20 
2 1 
advance of identification by me. 
22 56. Some of the conditions I noted were dangerous. Building 217 was used to store 
23 radioactive waste commodities (subject to NRC license controls) prior to being transported off 
24 the shipyard. On or about March 17, 2010 after the field crews had left for the day and I was 
25 
doing my "end-of-day" RAD integrity field check, I discovered that RCA posted Building 217 
26 
27 
had been left unsecured. We had a recurring problem with trespassers at the shipyard and they or 
28 anyone else could have gained unimpeded access to the radiologically controlled interior 
30 
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1 portions of the building and come in contact with radioactive material stored inside and subject 
2 
to controls dictated by Tetra Tech EC's NRC materials license. 
3 
57. On two other occasions, I discovered similar problems at Building 217. On or about 
4 
5 
March 23, 2010 I found the building unsecured; a padlock on the latch used to secure the front 
6 sliding door was left open. On April 23, 2010, I again found the building unsecured; a window 
7 was propped open and a table was underneath it outside of the building, an open invitation for 
8 
unauthorized people- in particular trespassers referred to as "Copper Miners"- to go inside. 
9 
10 
58. Unsecured areas were not only a problem at Building 217. On December 20, 2010, for 
11 example, I noticed that the lock was not secured at Radiation Screening Yard 4, or "RSY-4" in 
12 Parcel E; nor was the lock secured at the Utility Corridor work area gate. 
13 
59. Twice, on or about November 18, 2010 and again on January 18, 2011, I discovered 
14 
operative employee drinking water stations improperly staged inside a conspicuously posted 
15 
16 
Radiologically Controlled Area ("RCA"), in violation of the clearly posted prohibition of eating 
17 or drinking within an RCA. The first time, I noted that the corresponding RAD posting sign had 
18 also been tampered with. On both occasions, the ropes delineating the RCA had been improperly 
19 
repositioned - and without authorization. The second time, I was accompanied by Eric 
20 
21 
Abkemeier, Tetra Tech's license Radiation Safety Officer ("RSO"), my direct technical report. 
22 60. On several occasions I discovered work going on that, as project RSO representative, I 
23 should have been informed about before its initiation, but wasn't. For example, sometime in 
24 2009, within what was called the "700 Triangle Area," I pointed out to Bill Dougherty and 
25 
Dennis Me Wade some sections within the area that had highly elevated RAD-soil contaminants, 
26 
27 
which I knew of from prior work experience associated with the "open field" area - work 
28 suspended by RASO immediately after the contaminated area was discovered. Despite the fact I 
31 
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1 informed them of the RAD contaminants present, I noticed some days later there was intrusive 
2 soil movement activity going on in this location- again sometrung I had "stumbled upon" - and 
3 
likewise, without prior notification that such an activity was about to begin. 
4 
5 
61. On March 18, 20 I 0 while doing my "end-of-day" RAD integrity field check, I found 
6 indications of intrusive activity having occurred earlier that day (in radiological terms, "intrusive 
7 activity" refers- in this instance, to "impacted area" earth movement during construction of an 
8 
alternate access road throughway). The work was taking place in a Parcel E area posted for 
9 
10 
radiological controls. The objective was to construct a temporary access throughway to be used 
11 by the University of California, San Francisco, which had (and still maintains) a facility on the 
12 shipyard. A temporary throughway was necessary because the existing entrance was going to be 
13 
dug up and become impassable during upcoming sub-surface "utility corridor" RAD 
14 
characterization and remediation work Tetra Tech EC was doing for the Navy. This was a new 
15 
16 
work area activity and during the afternoon debrief that same day, McWade, when asked if he 
17 had anything to share, said nothing while shaking his head from side to side to indicate he had no 
18 new information to add. No one else in attendance at the debrief indicated new work was 
19 
occurring in that area. I had not been informed by Me Wade, any of the RAD supervisors 
20 
21 
reporting to me, or anyone else that work involving the breach of a Hunters Point property 
22 boundary barricade had begun. 
23 62. Prior to starting the new work, the outermost boundary of the radiologically impacted 
24 work area extended up to portions of Hunters Point property boundary fencing- a double fence 
25 
barricade separating public properties from Hunters Point Shipyard. As part of"right-to-know" 
26 
27 
communication, yellow and magenta RAD signs were posted on the inside portion ofthe 
28 
32 
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1 outermost property boundary fence - facing away from Hunters Point toward the general public 
2 side to alert that the shipyard side of the barricade was a Radiologically Controlled Area (RCA). 
3 
63. The site previously had a permanently installed high integrity inner and outer fence 
4 
5 
representative of clearly established boundary barricades conspicuously posted to warn of RAD-
6 oriented hazards within. On March 18, 201 0, however, contrary to the definition of a secured 
7 boundary, significant portions of both the inner and outer fence had been extracted and signs of 
8 
initial "heavy equipment" earth movement were evident. Flimsy overlapping fence panels, some 
9 
10 
held together with low grade hand-twisted wire and some not wired together at all, were staged 
11 in place of the outermost barricade. Nothing was erected in place of the permanent inner fence 
12 portion now missing as well. The original RAD postings from the removed permanent fencing 
13 
sections appeared to have been forcibly ripped away, with one posting now on the ground in 
14 
some nearby overgrowth, and the other "dangling" from the edge of a permanent inner fence 
15 
16 
section left intact. 
17 64. Within the next day or so, Anthony Smith was assigned to the area and found sources of 
18 radioactive material located between the inner and outer property boundary fence being worked. 
19 
The source was fire brick that had not been detected before Smith did his survey that day. 
20 
21 
65. I was alarmed by the severity of NRC license compromise that was obviously and 
22 knowingly left un-remedied by Tetra Tech EC RAD supervisor Justin Hubbard (and each RAD-
23 trained project employee working alongside him, and McWade). Ifi had not "stumbled across it" 
24 
and corrected the deficiencies, I have no doubt whatsoever that had the NRC encountered exactly 
25 
what I did that same day and time, serious implications would have resulted for Tetra Tech EC 
26 
27 
and its NRC license. 
28 
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1 66. Similarly, on or about June 25, 2010, I discovered after-hours work involving unimpeded 
2 access to "RAD-irnpacted" areas of the project site. Work was being performed by a non-project 
3 
utility provider. Allowed to access the shipyard as "visitors," the service team was not under the 
4 
5 
direct escort and supervision of a RAD-safety designated Tetra Tech EC representative. The 
6 incident was occurring along Parcel E's "Utility Corridor Roadway." Unattended Pacific Gas 
7 and Electric personnel were in lift-buckets extending around and above conspicuously posted 
8 
RCA work areas created by Tetra Tech EC. The Pacific Gas and Electric crews were working on 
9 
1 0 
overhead wiring in multiple locations. I was not advised of plans for this after-hours work to 
11 occur and, as in earlier incidents, happened to "stumble" upon what was happening. As project 
12 RSOR, once again I should have been informed so I could assess the planned activity and ensure 
13 





67. During the portion of my Hunters Point tenure while I was a Tetra Tech EC employee, 
17 increasingly disturbing discoveries of what were, simply put, purely avoidable non-compliance 
18 issues escalated, reflecting "attention to detail" lapses of the type not expected of"ANSI 3.1-
19 
designated" professionals. What I found during " in field" inspections involved, in part, the 
2 0 
2 1 
improper posting of RAD-controlled areas, most often those being actively worked. 
2 2 68. Recurring posting compromises, typically discovered during days' end "RAD integrity" 
23 field checks, were both surprising and unacceptable. Prior to leaving for the day, corresponding 
24 RAD-safety supervisors, as well as their assigned HP ' s, and fellow RAD-trained work crews, 
25 
were personally and repeatedly reminded during morning safety tailgates to secure work areas 
26 
27 
and verify intact RAD postings at shift's end. Nevertheless, it was me, the project RSO, who was 
2 8 
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1 way too often "happening upon" these compromising conditions which - if left uncorrected, 
2 
would represent a violation of Tetra Tech EC' s NRC license. 
3 
69. For example, on or about September 16, 2009, l noticed that the RAD posting at an area 
4 
5 
referred to as "Installation Removal 7," or "IR-07'' in the Parcel B portion of the shipyard did not 
6 compliantly reflect "right-to-know" postings warning of RAD safety hazards (for project cleanup 
7 purposes, the Hunters Point Shipyard was divided into Parcels A-G). I documented and corrected 
8 
the right-to-know" compromise. In another example, I likewise discovered and had to personally 
9 
10 
correct a non-compliant RAD posting scenario on or about April 7, 2010 at Radiation Screening 
11 Yard 4, or "RSY-4", in Parcel D. 
12 70. There were also instances where RAD posting "discrepancies," and active work activities 
1 3 
involving NRC licensees Tetra Tech EC and Shaw Environmental (a Tetra Tech EC competitor), 
14 
came to be in conflict. One example occurred on December 1, 2010, when I observed heavy 
1 5 
16 
equipment (Shaw Environmental rentals), being used to transfer imported fill sand, entering and 
17 exiting a posted RAD "Contaminated Area" in Parcel E. More often referred to as the Installation 
1 8 Removal2, or IR-02, portion of the shipyard, the activity, which was occurring without the 
19 
presence of Shaw Environmental RAD-safety oversight, allowed for multiple large-capacity 
2 0 
21 
dump trucks to deliver "clean" import sand (originating from an offsite source) directly into the 
22 muddy, rain saturated Shaw Environmental RCA. Then the trucks exited the same 
23 "Contaminated Area" location without first being RAD-monitored for contamination of the 
24 transport tires and "foot traffic" shoe soles. Tetra Tech EC had work occurring alongside the 
25 
observed Shaw Environmental IR-02 activity, inside a location referred to as the Parcel E 
26 
27 
"Triangle Area." The "Triangle Area" was also posted as a RCA subject to radiological controls, 
28 but survey monitoring did not indicate elevated contaminants wan·anting "Contaminated Area" 
35 






























designation. Intersecting the Shaw Environmental and Tetra Tech EC work area RCA's was a 
"non-impacted" roadway (constructed with placement of a high durability liner covered with 
clean import sand and gravel). A critical purpose of the "non-impacted" roadway was to allow 
for vehicle movement (e.g., those associated with project staff transport, security patrols, 
management inspections, VIP "windshield" tours, RAD integrity checks, rental equipment 
delivery and pick up, etc.) throughout "high contaminant probability" shipyard locations with 
reduced risk of source contaminant transfer to vehicle tires (e.g., metal slivers in tire treads 
originating from rusty, deteriorated deck markers, dials, and like items haphazardly disposed of 
over the decades, although associated with very highly radiotoxic Ra-226 contaminants, etc.). As 
is industry standard, project personnel and equipment associated with "intrusive activities" inside 
RAD "impacted areas" at Hunters Point always required RAD clearance monitoring before 
crossing back into a "non-RAD impacted" area. In this situation, which was clearly incompatible 
with general RAD-safety practices and expected NRC licensee protocol, the referenced Shaw 
Environmental activity compromised established and recognized industry standards designed to 
reliably prevent uncontrolled RAD contaminant migration. 
71. There was also another example adversely impacting the same Shaw Environmental "IR-
02" and Tetra Tech EC "Triangle Area" locations. In December 2010, there was a series of 
unusually strong winter storms bringing heavy downpours of rainwater. Beginning on December 
17, 201 0 and continuing through about December 21st, I witnessed storm water that had 
accumulated in Shaw Environmental's RAD "Contaminated Area" overflowing from IR-02 onto 
the "non-impacted" roadway. In concert with each subsequent downpour, the storm water was 
''pending" so much so that, at its peak, its mass engulfed not only large portions within the Shaw 
Environmental RAD "Contaminated Area" and the "non-impacted" roadway, but also consumed 
36 
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1 adjoining surfaces extending into the Tetra Tech EC "Triangle Area" (still under RAD controls, 
2 but not with "Contaminated Area" designation). This example was clearly incompatible with 
3 
general RAD-safety practices and expected NRC licensee protocol. The disintegrating conditions 
4 
5 
that resulted due to Shaw Environmental 's work strategy compromised established and 





Removal from the Shipyard 
11 72. On January 12, 2011, another event occurred near "the triangle area" when I was doing 
12 my end-of-day field check. I saw two Tetra Tech trucks driving through an area with radiological 
13 concerns in Parcel E. As RSOR, I should have been aware of any activity taking place at that 
14 
location, but I was not and the HP in charge of the area, Justin Hubbard, was not there to monitor 
15 
16 
the activity. The next morning I attended the regular supervisors meeting and questioned 
17 Hubbard about the fmding I had made the night before. He just "blew up," verbally attacking me 
18 saying that there were not any radiological concerns at this place because this area has been 
19 
downgraded. This wasn't the case. It was the culmination of increasing problems I had been 
20 
21 
fmding. Bill Dougherty, the Project Manager, heard the commotion and came into the room. He 
22 sided with Hubbard and told me, "You seem to have concerns about all of this because it's your 
23 name that's on the license. I can arrange to have it removed," or words to that effect. I took this 
24 as a threat to my job. 
25 
73. Later, I went to Bill Dougherty's office and told him that if we didn't get this issue 
26 
27 
resolved, as RSOR I'd be obligated to call the NRC to notif)r them of the license non-
28 compliance. Dougherty replied with words to the effect, "Call the NRC, call anyone you want, 
37 
Declarat ion of Elbert Bowers 
~ 
1 but while you're at it, pack your shit and get the hell off my project." I was removed from my 
2 
post as Tetra Tech' s RSOR at HPNS and transferred to its project at Alameda Naval Air Station, 
3 
where I worked for a time before getting laid off entirely. 
4 
5 
6 5-Minute Intervals Between Taking Soil Samples 
7 74. I was not aware of this at the time, but after I left Tetra Tech EC I learned that numerous 
8 
chain-of-custody, or "COC," documents for soil samples claimed they were taken every 5 
9 
10 
minutes precisely. COCs stated, for example, that certain soil samples were taken at 10:00 am, 
11 then at 10:05, 10:10, 10:15 and every 5 minutes thereafter. Based on my training, experience and 
12 familiarity with the sampling procedures specified in the site' s "Basewide Radiological Work 
13 Plan," I believe it was impossible to take soil samples every 5 minutes. Decontamination 
14 
between sample-taking alone was likely to take far beyond 5 minutes if done properly. 
15 
16 
Decontamination under the Work Plan was a 5-step process: 1) sampling equipment was scatmed 
17 using a hand-held meter; 2) the equipment would then be washed with a solution of non-
18 phosphate detergent and water; 3) it would be rinsed with potable water; 4) it would be rinsed a 
19 
second time with potable water; and 5) it would be set aside on a clean plastic covered surface 
20 
21 
and be allowed to air dry. In my experience, air drying alone could take 5 - 1 0 minutes, 
22 depending on the weather conditions. Had I known that COCs claimed soil samples were 
23 purportedly taken exactly 5 minutes apart, it would have raised immediate red flags that either 
2 4 
the COCs were filled out in error, which would violate proper COC procedures, or that sampling 
25 
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1 Fraudulent Class 1, 2 and 3 Building Scans 
2 
75. Among the projects Tetra Tech undertook at Hunters Point was one involving building 
3 
surveys to be done in three stages: Class 1, Class 2 and Class 3. 
4 
5 
76. The contract between the Navy and Tetra Tech defined Classes 1, 2, and 3 differently 
6 from the way supervisors in the field may have used the terms. Under the contract, Classes 1, 2, 
7 and 3 were defmed in large part based on infonnation as to whether the area was known to be 
8 
contaminated with radioactivity, suspected to be contaminated, or not believed to have 
9 
10 
contamination above free release levels, respectively. However, in practice, HP supervisors 
11 appear to have considered investigation of the floor and walls up to 2 meters high (or about six 
12 feet) to be Class L the upper walls to be class 2 and the ceiling and roof to be Class 3. 
13 77. I was not aware of it at the time, but since T left Hunters Point I have learned that project 
14 
HPs conducted fraudulent building surveys. Senior HP Anthony Smith informed me that his 
15 
16 
supervisor, Steve Rolfe, told Smith and his survey team to forgo doing Class 2 and 3. Rather, 
17 Smith and his team were instructed to "just get some numbers and get it done." They did what 
18 they were told and reported fraudulent numbers for those surveys of record. Smith informed me 
1 9 
that among the buildings for which he was told to ''just get some numbers," I recall included 
20 
21 
buildings in the 500 series and their footprints, 351 , 351A, 411,401 , 414,406, 144, 146, 130, 
22 113, 103, 146, 521 and possibly building 203, though he's said he was not certain about that site. 
23 Anthony Smith has told me that when Smith challenged tllis practice, he said Tetra Tech EC 
24 
RAD Safety Supervisor Steve Rolfe told him, "That's what Bill Dougherty 9Tetra Tech EC' s 
2 5 
Construction Project Manager) wants." 
2 6 
2 7 
78. Smith also told me that HP Rick Zahensky told him that he, Zahensky, also reported false 
2 8 data for RAD surveillance associated with Building 707. On yet another occasion, Rolfe told 
3 9 
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1 Zahensky and Smith "just set your meter down on the ground and let it count," or words to that 
2 
effect. Zahensky and Smith did so and reported the fraudulent data that resulted. I was not aware 
3 
of this fraud, and not aware that the supervisors under me were following the directions of 
4 
5 
construction management, namely Dougherty and McWade. I am saddened to conclude that the 
6 HP supervisors with whom I worked effectively lied to and misled me by not informing me of 





11 Unqualified Laborers Doing Sampling 
12 79. After I left HPNS, I also became aware that Tetra Tech EC used untrained laborers to 
13 





17 Complaint to the NRC 
18 80. As both a License RSO and Project RSO representative while at Hunters Point, I felt I 
19 
shouldered some degree of responsibility and accountability for any violations of the NRC 
20 
21 
license and felt obligated to report it according to regulatory protocol detailed in NRC form 3. I 
22 tried to share my concerns with the NRC, which conducted a Tetra Tech EC requested 
23 "inspection" (not to be confused with investigation, and requested by Tetra Tech to trick the 
24 NRC into finding fault with me, and ignore the frauds of the company) from March 29 through 
25 
March 31, 2011. After this inspection, NRC inspectors Bailey and Nicholson came to talk to me 
26 
27 
in Alameda, CA after normal work hours. They asked me about the concern I had about Tetra 
28 Tech EC's radiation safety program but they limited the meeting to about 90 minutes. This only 
40 
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1 face-to-face meeting with NRC representatives - who appeared technically astute in rad-safety 
2 
matters and proper remediation procedures, did not remotely provide a sufficient platform 
3 
needed to fully capture the magnitude and depth of licensee oriented RAD-safety concerns which 
4 
5 
in my opinion continue to pose very likely, long-term, detrimental health threats to all having 
6 had a physical presence at the shipyard while fraud was committed (as well as consequential 
7 threats impacting the surrounding environment and the general public nearby). The Special 
8 
Agent, whom I met with in subsequent face-to-face meetings on behalf of the NRC admitted he 
9 
10 
possessed no RAD-oriented background whatsoever. I never had the opportunity to fully share 
11 all my concerns. I tried to reach NRC officials, leaving numerous messages, but an 
12 overwhelming majority of my efforts went unanswered. I don't think the NRC took my 
13 
complaints about Tetra Tech seriously, nor do I think that a real or thorough enough 
14 
investigation was conducted by the NRC at that time and for the years thereafter, to the present. 
15 
16 
I understand that in June of2016, Anthony Smith met with the NRC and explained in great detail 
17 a number of these radiological frauds addressed throughout these declarations, but the NRC has 
18 not subsequently contacted me or followed up with Susan Andrews (who I know also reported to 
19 
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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 
NAVAL FACILITIES ENGINEERING COMMAND SOUTHWEST 
1220 PACIFIC HIGHWAY 
SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 92132-5190 
VIA E-MAIL TO: andrew.Bolt@tetratech.com 
Tetra Tech EC Inc 
Attn: Andrew Bolt 
1230 Columbia St, Suite 750 
San Diego CA 92101 
IN REPLY REFER TO: 
1000809 
RAQBO.CK 
24 June 2011 
Subject: MODIFICATION 03 TO CONTRACT N62473-1 0-D-0809, CTO 0004, BASE WIDE 
RADIOLOGICAL SUPPORT AT HUNTERS POINT SHIPYARD, SAN FRANCISCO, CA 
Please submit a fee proposal for the enclosed scope of work dated June 24, 2011. Your fee proposal must 
be delivered via e-mail to cynthia.mafara@navy.mil no later than the close of business July 11, 2011. A 
Contract Negotiation Board will review your proposal and if negotiations are required, you will be 
contacted by telephone to set up a mutually convenient time. 
This does not constitute a notice to proceed nor shall it be considered as a commitment on the part of the 
government. Any costs incurred prior to award of this contract task order modification cannot be 
reimbursed. 
Your cooperation in submitting the requested information within the specified time is appreciated. If you 





Scope of Work Dated June 24,2011 
SCOPE OF WORK 
CONTRACT N62473-10-D-0809 
MODIFICATION TO CT0-0004 
BASEWIDE RADIOLOGICAL SUPPORT 
AT HUNTERS POINT SHIPYARD 
SAN FRANCISCO, CA 
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 
NAVAL FACILITIES ENGINEERING COMMAND SOUTHWEST 
SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 92132-5190 
DATED 24 JUNE 201 1 
SECTION 1 - GENERAL 
Page 1 of21 
This Contract Task Order (CTO) modification is to provide Base-Wide radiological support under the Contractor's 
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Broad Scope Radioactive Material License (RML) to enable 
contractors to complete both chemical and radiological removal and remediation work at Hunters Point Shipyard. 
Base-wide radiological support includes operating two Radiological Screening Yards (RSYs) that accept and 
process radiologically impacted soils from impacted storm and sanitary sewers removals at Hunters Point Shipyard 
(HPS), providing on-site and off-site radiological laboratory screening and conformation sample analysis, 
performing routine surveys of radiologically impacted buildings and sites, maintaining site-wide radiological 
postings and controls, routinely providing site specific radiological training, providing radiological support to 
contractors performing non-radiological work in a radiologically-impacted site, and other activities described within 
this SOW at the Hunters Point Shipyard, San Francisco California (Figure 1). The duration of work under this 
Contract Task Order is 12 months with an Option period for an additional 12 months. The Department of the Navy 
(Navy) Naval Facilities Engineering Command Southwest (NA VF AC SW) will administer this contract, and the 
Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Program Management Office (PMO) West will manage the Work Elements 
under this CTO. All references identified in basic contract remain in full effect. 
This Modification to Contract Task Order (CTO) -0004 is to extend the period of performance for Base-Wide 
radiological support under the Contractor's United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Broad 
Scope Radioactive Material License (RML) to enable contractors to complete both chemical and radiological 
work at Hunters Point Shipyard. This CTO Modification reflects a reduction in scope compared to Option 1 
due to changing laboratory requirements and a smaller volume of soil expected for screening. Deletions to 
the original Scope of Work (SOW) are lined out. Additions to the SOW are in bold font. This Modification 
extends the period of performance by approximately 8 calendar months to August 31, 2012. All references 
and requirements in the basic contract and original SOW remain in full effect. 
1.1 Performance Objective (s) are to provide the Base-Wide radiological support under the Contractor's 
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Broad Scope Radioactive Material License 
(RML) to enable contractors to complete both chemical and radiological removal and remediation 
work at Hunters Point Shipyard. The main objective(s) of this project are to provide on-site and off-
site laboratory services to support expedient turnaround of survey samples and optimize remediation 
effort, operate the two Radiological Screening Yards (RSYs 3 and 4), perform routine surveys of 
radiologically impacted buildings and sites, maintain site-wide radiological postings, routinely 
provide site specific radiological training, provide radiological support to contractors performing non-
radiological work in a radiologically-impacted site, and other activities described within this SOW, in 
order to supp01t radiological TCRAs and investigations performed under different SOWs. The main 
objective of the required laboratory services is to maintain on-site laboratory services (Section 
2.5.3.1) for analysis of radionuclides of concern in order to support expedient turnaround of survey 
samples, optimize remediation efforts, and procure and manage off-site radiological laboratory costs 
and services (Section 2.5.3.2). The main objectives of operation of the RSYs is to support 
radiological TCRAs and investigations performed under different SOWs. RSY operations in the next 
8 months are projected to support Radiological TCRA activities for: ( 1) Parcel C sewers and storm 
drain removal, (2) Parcel E 500 Series buildings, sites, sewers and storm drain removals, (3) Ship 
shielding range cleanup, and (4) Parcel E-2. 
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The contractor shall obtain final approval of the work required by BRAC PMO West, Naval Facilities 
Engineering Command and concurrence from appropriate regulatory agencies i.e. USEP A, DTSC, 
CDPH, and RWQCB upon completion of these performance objective(s). 
1.2 Background: After thorough review of the operational history of Hunters Point Shipyard (HPS) and 
site-specific investigation data, the Navy determined that multiple buildings and sites at Hunters Point 
Shipyard are radiologically-impacted and may contain residual radioactive contamination. This 
determination was documented in the Final Historical Radiological Assessment, Volume II (HRA) 
(Reference 4.2.7). Table 4-3 of the HRA lists the potential radionuclides of concern associated with 
the activities at Hunters Point Shipyard. The Navy is directing the current removal action under the 
Department of Defense Installation Restoration Program (IRP) and the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), along with the National Oil and Hazardous 
Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP). The Final Base-wide Radiological Removal Action, 
Action Memorandum- Revision 2006 outlines these removal actions. The Final Project Work Plan, 
Revision 3, Base-wide Storm Drain and Sanitary Sewer Removal outlines the procedures for 
removing and remediating the storm drain and sewer sanitary system for potential radiological 
contamination. The Base Wide Radiological Work Plan, Revision I outlines the procedures for 
surveying and remediating impacted buildings and sites for potential radiological contamination. 
Changes to the existing work plans and methodologies for surveying, remedial actions, and on-site 
laboratory performance/reporting are subject to review by the BRAC PMO and the regulators. Any 
new SOPs intended for use at HPS shall be submitted to the Navy for review and approval prior to use 
or integration with the Base-wide work documents. 
1.1 "PRE-PROPOSAL" CONFERENCE 
SECTION 2- WORK ELEMENTS 
The work elements under this SOW are identified as follows: 
• Work Element I- Project Management/Support/Administration 
• Work Element 2- Project Coordination and Meetings 
• Work Element 3- Project Infrastructure 
• Work Element 4- Planning Documents 
• Work Element 5- Site Support Activities 
2.1 WORK ELEMENT 1- PROJECT MANAGEMENT/ SUPPORT/ ADMINISTRATION 
This element includes personnel and resources for the management and control of project activities, such as scoping, 
planning, estimating, executing, tracking, controlling, analyzing, coordinating, and closure of this project. This 
element also includes direct management of the project, as well as the support for administrative functions needed 
for successful project management. 
Project management shall include coordination of the tasks in the scope work all on-going field activities at the site 
and responding to Navy requests for information as they occur. 
Project management shall also include appropriate coordination with Navy and Regulatory cultural and 
archaeological resource managers should actions under this SOW fall within an area of archaeological or historical 
zone on Hunters Point Shipyard. 
All work shall be performed under the contractor's Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) license. The contractor 
shall ensure that the NRC is notified of the site work at least 14 days prior to mobilization. A copy of the 
contractor's NRC license shall be provided to the Navy along with approved Standard Operating Procedures. A 
Memorandum of Understanding shall be signed by the contractor and Navy detailing responsibilities for radioactive 
materials and contamination handled at the site. 
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Project management shall also include the detailed tracking and planning, in consultation with BRAC PMO for work 
execution schedules for all radiological work in accordance with early transfer schedule goals. 
Invoicing shall conform to the measurement and payment items described later in this SOW. Sufficient detail shall 
be provided to enable Navy to reconcile the costs with the negotiated schedule of values in order to make fair 
progress payments. Upon request, the Navy Remedial Project Manager (RPM) or Resident/Regional Officer in 
Charge of Construction (ROICC) representative shall be provided with documentation that substantiates the basis of 
payment requests during construction. 
Project Management activities are anticipated to also include the following: 
• Provide Meeting minutes for kickoff meetings and meetings with Navy members and regulators. 
• Provide schedule and monthly progress reports to the Navy RPM and Radiological Affairs Support 
Office (RASO) 
• Conference calls at least once a week to update the Navy RPM and the RASO on the project status 
• E-mail daily site reports when field activities are occurring to Navy RPM and RASO 
• Review, approve, and track project costs and prepare financial information 
• Develop and maintain project files 
• Conduct administrative project close out contractual requirements 
• Weekly project QA/QC meetings and meeting notes with ROICC personnel during field operations 
2.2 WORK ELEMENT 2 - PROJECT MEETINGS 
2.2.1 KICK OFF MEETING 
2.2.2 BCT MEETINGS 
The contractor shall attend 2 BCT meetings during the course of the 8 month period of performance. 
2.2.3 CONTRACTOR COMMUNICATION COORDINATION AND MEETINGS 
Project meetings also entail coordination requirements between multiple contractors and the Navy. Meetings with 
the Base-wide Radiological Contractor, on-site laboratory manager, CSO, ROICC, BRAC PMO, NFECSW, RASO, 
corresponding Remedial Project Managers and CERCLA report project managers shall be accounted for under this 
task. During formal contractor coordination meetings, this Contractor shall be required to provide appropriate 
figures and or presentations to integrate with other contractors working on site. One formal contractor integration 
meeting is required during the 8 month period of performance. Weekly informal meetings will be required between 
various contractors operating on site. 
2.2.3.1 COMMUNICATION 
Effective communication is the key to the success of this project. The Contractor shall assist the Navy in preparing 
presentations to the community to the regulatory agencies at the monthly BRAC Cleanup Team (BCT) meetings. In 
addition, communication with other contractors performing work at HPS is critical. 
2.2.3.2 COORDINATION 
Coordination with other contractors is crucial throughout this project. Coordinating efforts will be required with 
BRAC PMO, NFECSW, RASO, CSO, ROICC, other on-site radiological remediation contractors, base-wide 
transportation and disposal contractors for chemical waste streams and radiological waste streams, ongoing 
groundwater treatability study contractors at Hunters Point (parcels G, D-1, C, and E), the base-wide groundwater 
monitoring program contractor, and appropriate BRAC Cleanup Team (BCT) members for site access coordination. 
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The Contractor shall interact and consult with the base-wide Low-Level Radiological Waste (LLRW) disposal 
contractor, and other contractors performing radiological work at HPS using several methods to convey field 
activities, issues, and information to all interested parties. The Contractor shall: 
• Coordinate with radiological remediation contractors through routine meetings. 
• Produce daily Production and Contractor Quality Control Reports that will be distributed electronically 
with a hard copy provided to the ROICC. 
• Host weekly Contractor Quality Control (CQC) meetings to be held with the ROICC and the CSO. The 
agenda shall describe the previous week's work and include a 3-week "look ahead" schedule. 
• Be available to join the weekly conference call between the BRAC and the RASO. 
• Submit a monthly progress report to the Remedial Project Manager (RPM) and Contracting Officers 
Technical Representative (COTR) to update costs, schedules, submittals, and accomplishments. 
• Submit data concerning RSY operations to RASO, the RPM, and when appropriate, to other site 
contractors on a routine basis. This information shall include pad scan data, systematic and biased sample 
data, figures with proposed remediation, pad investigative samples, Final Status Survey (FSS) results, 
proposed remediation, additional trench characterization, and pipe and manhole sediment analytical results. 
• The Contractor shall coordinate with the CSO and ROICC to establish soil stockpile staging areas, 
equipment staging areas, request HPS security passes from the San Francisco Redevelopment Agency 
(SFRA), identify sources ofwater for dust control, and identify other site requirements. 
• Contractor shall arrange meetings with the on-site laboratory contractor to coordinate logistical issues, 
sample submission procedures, data transfer options, and reporting requirements. 
2.3 WORK ELEMENT 3 - PROJECT INFRASTRUCTURE 
The Contractor shall provide a work environment that maintains the health and safety of working personnel at the 
shipyard as the Navy's number one priority. The Contractor shall maintain a health and safety program that 
encourages the prevention of all work-related accidents. The previously approved Site Safety and Health Plan 
(SSHP) shall be updated, if necessary, with appropriate references to work plans, Accident Prevention Plans 
(APPs), SSHP elements, and Activity Hazard Analyses (AHAs). 
Services should be provided in accordance with the current Architectural-Engineering (A-E) Guide for A-E Firms 
performing services for NEFCSW. 
2.3.1 PROCUREMENT 
This element includes personnel and resources used in the procurement of the project equipment and materials. 
Equipment, materials and supplies that are used throughout the fieldwork shall be procured and stored on site at a 
safe location. Note: Charges for procurement should be included in the cost of the equipment and materials, under 
the various technologies and structure elements. 
2.3.2 MOBILIZATION 
2.3.3 SITE CLEANUP AND DEMOBILIZATION 
The Contractor shall perform cleanup activities during progress ofthe Work, at the completion of the Work, and in 
accordance with the Basic Contract. The Contractor shall perform periodic cleanup to keep the site and adjacent 
properties free from accumulations of waste materials, rubbish, and windblown debris resulting from construction 
operations. As a condition precedent to final acceptance of the Work by the Government, the Contractor shall 
remove all waste materials, rubbish, and windblown debris resulting from construction operations. All sidewalks 
and streets affected by the work shall be swept clean and returned to a condition consistent with that prior to 
commencement of work. 
Upon finishing site cleanup and rece1vmg concurrence form a site inspection by the CSO and ROICC, the 
Contractor shall demobilize equipment, personnel, and facilities equipment from the site in an orderly manner. 
2.3.4 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT 
Base-wide logistical support should include the costs associated with rental of an appropriate number of field trailers 
and other costs associated with general contractor field operations support (e.g. copiers, trailer utilities, etc.). Initial 
period of logistical support should be for eight months. 
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The Contractor shall provide and maintain administrative field office facilities at Hunters Point. Government 
warehouse facilities will be available to the Contractor's personnel for equipment and sample storage. The 
Contractor shall be responsible for cleanliness and orderliness of the area used and for the security of any material or 
equipment stored in this area. 
The Contractor shall obtain the necessary permits for connections to necessary services provided by utility 
companies serving the project area. 
2.4 WORK ELEMENT 4- PLANNING DOCUMENTS 
2.4.1 EXECUTION PLAN 
The Contractor shall develop an Execution Plan, guidance document, detailing work procedures for executing the 
SOW. The Execution Plan shall be based on current and applicable Hunters Point Shipyard documents 
incorporating any necessary changes to the current applicable documents, appropriate Standard Operating 
Procedures, and Radiological Work Instructions as directed for review and approval by the Navy and federal and 
state regulators. The current Hunters Point Documents in which the work shall be accomplished unless otherwise 
stated in this SOW include the Base-wide Radiological Work Plan, Revision 1 Hunters Point Shipyard, San 
Francisco, CA October 2007; and the Final Project Work Plan, Revision 2, Base-wide Storm Drain and Sanitary 
Sewer Removal, Hunters Point Shipyard, San Francisco, California ("Base-wide Sewers and Storm Drain Work 
Plan"). The current Time Critical Removal Action falls under the Base-wide Removal Action Memorandum, 
Hunters Point Shipyard, San Francisco, California, Revision 2006. Additionally, applicable base-wide Standard 
Operating Procedures (SOPs), Hunters Point base work instructions, and NFECSW environmental work instructions 
are to be followed. The Contractor shall prepare and receive approval from NAVFAC SW Quality Assurance 
Officer (QAO) and the regulators for the Draft and Final Sampling and Analysis Plan (SAP) that incorporates the 
current Navy requirements for Field Sampling Plans and Quality Assurance Project Plans, as described in the 
NA VF ACSW Environmental Work Instruction #2 (Review, Approval, Revision, and Amendment of Sampling and 
Analysis Plans). 
The Contractor shall update as appropriate existing planning documents outlining their approach for completing this 
SOW. The Navy seeks to maintain the same approach under the current Base-wide Sewer and Storm Drain 
Removal Work Plan. The contractor shall perform radiological surveys and laboratory analyses as has been 
developed by the reference documents in Section 5. However, the Navy also seeks new and innovative approaches 
and efficiency gains. During the course of this SOW, the Contractor may propose alternative methods for achieving 
the same end state desired and execute new methods and procedures after receiving the Navy's (and BCT's where 
appropriate) concurrence. 
As previously stated The Contractor shall develop a detailed stand alone Execution Plan providing all the necessary 
information and details to perform this SOW utilizing the current regulatory approved Base-wide Radiological 
Work Plan, Base-wide Sewers and Storm Drain Work Plan, Design Plan, and approved modifications or deviations 
from these Base-wide Work Plans. The Execution Plan shall also have key Contractor specific plans that shall be 
developed by the Contractor. At a minimum the Execution Plan shall have an Introduction, Site Description and 
Background, Regulatory Framework, Radiological Control Plan, Final Status Surveys, Sewer and Storm Drain 
System Description, Field Work Implementation, Waste Management Plan, Radiological Protection Plan, and an 
Environmental Protection Plan. Additional Appendices as outlined in the key elements below are also required. 
2.4.1.1 ACCIDENT PREVENTION PLAN AND SITE SAFETY AND HEALTH PLAN 
The Contractor shall maintain the Accident Prevention Plan (APP) and a Site Safety and Health Plan (SSHP). 
Updates to the current APP and SSHP shall be submitted in the formats as required by the US Army Corps of 
Engineers' EM 385-1-1 manual. There are overlapping elements when preparing both APP and SSHP as provided 
in the Army's manual. The SSHP elements that overlap with the APP elements need not be duplicated provided 
each safety and health issue receives adequate attention and is documented in the APP/SSHP. The title of the plan 
shall be APP/SSHP and shall include all elements and sub-elements, including the AHA (Activity Hazard Analysis), 
as stated in the manual. In addition, the contractor shall comply with the requirements of the UFGS (Unified 
Facilities Guide Specifications) 01 35 29 (January 2008). 
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The APP/SSHP shall provide a safe and healthful environment for all personnel involved as well as personnel 
working near the sites. CertifY to the NA VF AC Southwest RPM that the Final APP/SSHP have been reviewed with 
each contractor and subcontractor employee prior to mobilization and start of fieldwork activities. 
An Internal Draft Final and Final APP/SSHP shall be submitted according to the schedule, and will be printed 
under a separate cover from the Work Plan. Both the APP/SSHP shall be immediately accessible to all workers at 
the site at all times during the project, and copies shall be mounted on, located adjacent to the contractor's Safety 
and Health Bulletin on site or available in every vehicle utilized for work under this Task Order. 
The contractor shall conduct an annual review of the APP/SSHP; the A HAs shall be "living" documents in that 
changes in the field shall be documented and added to the AHAs. The APP/SSHP shall be amended as appropriate 
and must be reviewed and accepted by the Navy RPM, NA VF AC Command Safety Officer, and Navy and Marine 
Public Health Center (NMPHC) Safety Officer. 
2.4.1.2 STORM WATER POLLUTION PREVENTION PLAN 
The Contractor shall prepare a project-specific SWPPP to supplement the current contractor-prepared base-wide 
SWPPP for sewer work performed at HPS. This shall include specific installation and maintenance of Best 
Management Practices (BMPs) for controlling storm water. A general NPDES storm water construction permit is 
not required because the activities are conducted under Section 12l(e) of CERCLA. The SWPPP shall be 
maintained and updated as necessary. At a minimum the SWPPP shall cover the site description, Best Management 
Practices (BMPs) to be implemented for construction activities, BMPs to be implemented for erosion and sediment 
control, waste management and disposal spill responses, post-construction controls, site inspection and monitoring 
programs, responsible personnel, training requirements, and certifications and compliance requirements. The 
SWPPP shall meet the requirements of the State of California general permit for storm water discharges from 
construction sites. Submit the SWPPP along with any required Notice of Intents, Notice of Termination, and 
appropriate permit fees, via the Contracting Officer, to the appropriate State agency for approval, a minimum of 14 
calendar days prior to the start of construction. A copy of the approved SWPPP shall be kept at the construction site 
office, and continually updated as regulations are required to reflect current site conditions. 
All applicable NFECSW Environmental Work Instructions shall be followed. 
2.4.1.3 SAMPLING AND ANALYSIS PLAN 
The existing base-wide sampling and analysis plans (SAPs) shall be maintained and updated as necessary. The 
current SAP (Attachment I) for both the Base-Wide Radiological Work Plan and the Sewer and Sanitary Storm 
Drain Work Plan shall be followed and may be referenced appropriately to develop any future on site support SAPs. 
The Contractor shall also be responsible for producing and providing a SAP package that may be utilized and 
referenced by other on site radiological remediation contractors in their SAP. This package shall meet the 
UFP/QAPP requirements for SAPs and provide applicable on-site laboratory standard operating procedures. 
2.4.1.4 QUALITY CONTROL/ QUALITY ASSURANCE PLAN 
The Contractor shall maintain and update as necessary a Quality Control and Quality Assurance Plan. At a 
minimum the Contractor shall include: 
• A description of the quality control organization, including a chart showing lines of authority; 
• The name, qualifications, duties, authorities, and responsibilities of each person assigned a QC function; 
• A schedule for managing submittals, testing, inspections, and any other QA function (including those of 
Contractors, Subcontractors, fabricators, suppliers, purchasing agents, etc.) that involves assuring quality 
workmanship, verifYing compliance with the plans and specifications, or any other QC objectives. An 
outline on the courses of action for how the on-site laboratory shall perform third party review of the 
laboratory shall also be included. Internal review and third party review shall include inspections to verifY 
compliance with all environmental requirements, and may also encompass air quality and emissions 
monitoring records and waste disposal records, etc; 
• Reporting procedures and reporting format for QAIQC activities including such items as daily summary 
reports, schedule of data submissions, inspection data sheets, problem identification and corrective 
measures reports, evaluation reports, acceptance reports, and final documentation. 
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2.4.1.5 MATERIALS DATA MANAGEMENT 
A large quantity of data will be produced and managed to prepare the needed documentation to achieve the remedial 
goals at Hunters Point. The current Hunters Point "cradle-to-grave" data management system integrates all phases 
of the work process from the initial excavation through backfilling of the trench survey units including: lifecycle 
tracking of excavated material, tracking excavated pipe and manholes. The Contractor shall operate and maintain a 
data management system that has the ability to support multiple "current/and to be awarded" radiological remedial 
action contracts and task orders being performed by the different Hunters Point contractors. 
The Contractor data management system should be capable and able to be used to efficiently generate routine 
updates for the RPM, and be able to allow the Contractor to quickly and accurately respond to data requests from the 
Navy, and allow the Project Manager to identifY trends. The Contractor under this SOW shall provide the on-site 
radiological remediation contractors with analytical laboratory data associated with their projects suitable for their 
upload into the Navy NEDD-NIRIS database. 
LIFECYCLE TRACKING OF EXCAVATED MATERIAL 
Truck tickets are prepared by The Contractor's field engineer initiating the tracking activities necessary for each 
truckload of excavated material going to the RSY. Each on-site radiological remediation contractor shall be 
responsible for bringing truckloads of excavated material to the RSY for screening and placing the truckload of 
material on the appropriate screening pad as directed by The Contractor. The Contractor shall ensure pertinent 
information related to each truckload (e.g., IR site identification (if appropriate), trench segment identification and 
load numbers and screen pad identification numbers and unique stockpile identification number) will be entered into 
the data management system on a daily basis as a component of the tracking process. The data management system 
will continue to track each load of excavated soil from when it is first placed on a screening pad through the 
scanning, sampling, and if necessary, remediation activities performed by The Contractor. If the soil is free-
released, it shall be stockpiled outside ofthe RSY; ifthe soil is contaminated, it shall be disposed of as LLRW by 
the Navy's radiological waste contractor. The Contractor shall communicate with the on-site radiological 
remediation contractors as to when each stockpile becomes available for use as backfill or whether soil is disposed 
of as LLRW such that the information can be duly recorded in the database. Each truckload and each stockpile shall 
be carefully tracked through the data management system, to enable on-site radiological remediation contractors to 
be able to backfill the soil generally within the same area from which it was excavated. 
TRACKING EXCAVATED PIPE AND MANHOLES 
Information shall be entered into the tracking database for the excavated pipe and manholes. Each pipe segment and 
manhole excavated shall be numbered with the associated trench segment identification number and consecutive 
piece number and shall be closely tracked to ensure that potentially radioactive materials are properly controlled and 
that each pipe and manhole are radiologically surveyed. The type and dimensions of the piping and the date on 
which it was excavated shall be recorded in the database as well as other relevant metadata. By using the data 
management system, Contractor shall be able to generate and issue accurate lists to the field of piping to be 
radiologically surveyed for release or disposed of as LLRW. 
SAMPLE CHAIN-OF-CUSTODY 
Using the data management system, the Contractor shall track all samples from the time the sample arrives at the on-
site laboratory. The Contractor shall ensure that the database management system includes a chain-of-custody 
(COC) module that generates the sample labels and COC forms to minimizing errors. The Contractor shall use the 
COC module to upload COC information into the database management system on a daily basis. The COC shall 
include information related to the sample and collection locations. The Contractor shall work with all on-site 
radiological remediation contractors to ensure that the same COC form and naming convention is used for samples 
submitted to the on-site laboratory. 
2.4.1.6 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROLS 
The Execution Plan that shall include appendices that specifically address environmental controls. These plans shall 
be a further refinement of the existing plans that have been successfully used to perform work at HPS for the past 
several years. 
WASTE MATERIAL MANAGEMENT 
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The Contractor shall prepare a Waste Material Management Plan to supplement the current Contractor-prepared 
base-wide Waste Management Plan. The plan shall present waste management practices, coordination, procedures 
for the LLR W waste expected to be generated during the field activities. 
Waste minimization practices shall be followed to reduce the volume of waste generated, stored, and removed from 
the site with an emphasis on recycling to the extent practicable. 
DUST CONTROL 
Contractor shall maintain strict dust control practices while performing this SOW at HPS. Of special concern is a 
"Community Asbestos Monitoring" station known as HV-10 in the parking lot of Building 101 near the corner of 
Fisher and Robinson Street. Dust control is an ongoing issue within the community and to the Navy. Contractor 
shall manage dust during the operation of the RSYs including the yards and the truck routes to and from the RSYs. 
AIR MONITORING 
Air monitoring shall be employed during all outdoor radiological activities. Specifically, Contractor shall: 
• Install wind socks to allow the radiological supervisor to determine the prevailing wind direction and 
ensure proper placement of the radiological air monitoring equipment on a daily basis. 
• Operate the upwind and downwind air monitoring equipment for asbestos, PMIO, TSP, lead and 
magnesium and ensure it is operational prior to any invasive work. 
• Perform air monitoring for worker safety using NIOSH sampling and analysis methodologies. 
• Brief site workers on the California Air Resource Board regulation concerning "Asbestos Airborne Toxic 
Control Measures for Construction Sites" to comply with the substantive requirements identified in 
section (d) for "Road Construction and Maintenance. 
• Review dust control procedures and place equipment to limit fugitive dust. 
2.5 WORK ELEMENT 5- SITE SUPPORT ACTIVITIES 
The Contractor shall be required to maintain appropriate radiological work area controls. Coordination efforts will 
be required with the Navy and other contractors on site to control access to the radiological work areas established 
as part of this SOW. 
2.5.1 ON SITE CONTINGENCY WORK 
The Contractor shall provide radiological screening support to other contractors involved at HPS as directed by the 
Navy including field staffing of an on-site portal monitor to allow for screening of all exiting haul vehicles during 
normal working hours. Work shall include conducting radiological awareness briefings (minimum of 15 I-hour 
briefings) and development and/or modification of work instructions (minimum of 8) that shall be followed to 
support other non-radiological remediation contractors (minimum of 135 hours field support, 2-person team) in 
executing non-radiological work in radiologically impacted areas. 
The Contractor shall provide radiological support associated with the planned Parcel G and E ground water 
remediation and monitoring being performed by other Navy contractors and subcontractors. 
In addition to the requirements described above the Contractor shall provide the following under this work element: 
• Surveys of incoming/outgoing equipment. 
• Thermo luminescent dosimeters (TLDs) for staff and other non-radiological remediation contractors 
performing work in radiologically impacted areas. 
• Site-wide radiological controls and postings in radiologically-impacted areas not covered by an on-site 
radiological remediation contractor. 
• Routine radiological surveys with respect to the RSYs operations. 
• Work Instructions for of site specific radiological support. 
• Prepare and/or update HPS Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) 
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2.5.2 OFF-SITE CONTINGENCY RESPONSE WORK 
Costs associated with off-site contingency work shall be presented as an option separate from the base bid. 
The contingency response work element shall include a rapid response (as quickly as possible, but no longer than 
one working day from notification) to support the Navy's need to quickly assess and address off-site remedial needs. 
These needs are anticipated to include situation assessment and sampling for either chemical and/or radiological 
parameters with a rapid analytical report period and also the potential removal and stockpiling of materials as 
directed on a selected Navy-owned property area. Non-radiological waste disposal may also be required as parts of 
this task, but no radiological disposal costs are assumed with the exception of waste characterization support. 
Assume 2 separate response actions entailing 5 analyses for full chemical and radiological parameters (15 total), 4-
hours each for a 4-person team (80 hours total), and the excavation, transportation, and storage of 150 cubic yards of 
materials. 
2.5.3 ANALYTICAL LABORATORY SERVICES 
The Contractor shall be responsible for procuring the following on-site and off-site laboratory services. 
2.5.3.1 ON-SITE RADIOLOGICAL LABORATORY 
Contractor shall maintain operation of an on-site radiological screening laboratory to support the on-going field 
survey efforts and support over-all radiological operations at the site. Staffing and equipment should be balanced to 
support the anticipated survey sampling needs site-wide. Laboratory analyses are to be supported by a minimum of 
eight (8)gamma spectroscopy units and one (1) swipe sample analysis machine. The Contractor shall include all 
laboratory equipment and trailer rental requirements. The Contractor shall also account for archiving and storage of 
soil and sediment samples. For estimation purposes the contractor can anticipate a throughput of 400 gamma scans 
per week during the period of performance of this contract task order modification. Some variation is expected. 
The laboratory shall adjust resources to maintain a 7-day turnaround time. 
• The Contractor shall ensure that the on-site laboratory equipment is verified quarterly to maintain 
accuracy in screening radiological samples. 
SAMPLE SUBMITTAL 
It is recommended that samples be submitted as a functional unit such as a complete survey unit, trench 
characterization, etc. This allows the Jab to process the samples as a unit and the data is reported when the entire 
unit is complete. The following are current procedures the radiological remediation contractors used while 
submitting samples; 
• Soil samples are submitted using a completed Chain-of-Custody (CoC) form. 
• The naming convention for the samples conforms to the SAP associated with the Base Wide Radiological 
Work Plan (example of naming conventions provided) 
• Each soil sample provided to the Jab should contain approximately 1000 grams of soil. 
• Each sample should be double bagged to account for damage from the field, to account for wet samples, 
etc. 
• Both of the bags shall contain the sample ID and other corresponding info from the CoC, (date, time, mR 
reading) 
• Submitter should note any unusual odors or site conditions, and if it is known to contain chemical 
contamination, asbestos, PCBs, fuel, etc. (for the safety of the Jab techs) 
• The Jab tech on duty will sign the CoC after insuring that the samples correspond to the associated CoC 
• After signing, a copy of the CoC is provided to the lab manager for tracking, inventory, prioritization, etc. 
SAMPLE PREP 
Listed below are examples of current routine sampling prep procedures to be used for comparison purposes. 
• Samples are placed on a metal tray and dried in oven for approximately 2-4 hrs 
• Samples with odors or other contaminants are air dried (which may extend processing time) 
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• Samples are run through a series of sieves, approximately 350-400 grams of soil is required to perform on 
site gamma spectroscopy 
• Once sieved, the soil is placed into sample containers, sealed with tape, and then the mR perlhr (provided 
by sample submitter) and the dry weight is written on the top of the container 
SAMPLE ANALYSIS 
Listed below are examples of current routine sampling analysis procedures currently used for comparison purposes. 
• Samples are processed through the lab as directed by the Navy 
• The lab tech places the samples into the lead cave 
• The sample ID, date, time, weight, and the tech ID processing the samples are entered into the computer 
that controls the gamma spec unit 
• Samples are analyzed using the on site gamma spectroscopy for a 45 minute count time 
• At the end of the 45 minute count time the technician reviews the report 
• Based on this initial review, the technician may process the sample for an additional 90 minutes based on 
pre-set criteria (interference, resolution, uncertainty, etc.) 
• Equipment software generates an output file for each sample analysis 
• A the end of each shift, the technician prepares an report file (ASCI file) for management review 
DATA REVIEW 
Listed below are examples of current routine data review steps/procedures to be used for estimation purposes. 
• Each shift ASCI report file is reviewed by the lab technician who performed the analysis, the shift 
supervisor, and the lab manager 
• Any of these reviewers may initiate a re-analysis in an effort to provide accurate data 
• Once reviewed, the data is deemed acceptable, and a PDF file of the ASCI file is created 
• Both the PDF and the ASCI files are made available to the submitting contractor 
• The data packages from the on site analyses are not intended, and are not sufficient, for data validation. 
LABORATORY ANALYSIS CONTINGENCY PLAN 
The Contractor shall prepare an in-house laboratory contingency plan that will document procedures used to address 
on-site laboratory equipment failures, disruptions in or loss of off-site laboratory services, and procedures to 
increase on-site production and off-site laboratory procurement if capacity modifications are requested by the Navy. 
2.5.3.2 OFF SITE LABORATORY SUPPORT 
The Contractor shall procure off-site analytical services in support of the on-site screening laboratory. The 
off-site analytical laboratory shall be Department of Defense (DoD) Environmental Laboratory Accreditation 
Program (ELAP) certified and California Department of Public Health ELAP certified where applicable. 
• All definitive data used in conjunction with Final Status Surveys shall be sent to the off-site 
laboratory 
• The off-site data shall be validated and provided electronically to The Contractors. 
• The on-site lab will submit samples requiring additional analysis to the off-site laboratory for processing. 
For estimation purposes, the Contractor shall assume up to 7,000 alpha spectroscopy samples will be 
sent off-site with a 10-day turnaround time (TAT). 
• Further off-site analysis of other radioisotopes may be requested by the Navy RPM during the period 
of performance. Off-site analysis of these following radioisotopes shall constitute an equivalent 
number of off-site gamma spectroscopy analyses: 
o Gamma Spectroscopy to include Radium 226, Cesium 137, and up to 20 total isotopes 
Radium 226 in water 
o Total Alpha Radium (TAR)- screening for Radium 226 in water 
o Tritium 
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o Total Strontium - screening for total strontium 
o Strontium 90 
o Gross Alpha and Beta 
o Isotopic Plutonium including Pu-238 and Pu-239 
o Isotopic Thorium including Th-228 and Th-230 
o Isotopic Uranium including U-233, U-235, and U-238 
2.5.4 RADIOLOGICAL SCREENING YARD 
The Contractor shall manage and operate the two Radiological Screening Yards (RSYs 3 & 4) at Hunters Point. The 
RSYs will provide soil and material screening support for sewer removal and remedial activities as required by 
contractor work plans such as, but not limited to, the Base-wide Radiological Work Plan and Base-wide Stonn Drain 
and Sanitary Sewer Removal Work Plan. 
The Contractor shall be responsible for receiving materials in the RSY from other on-site radiological remediation 
contractors. The on-site radiological remediation contractors will coordinate with the RSY management personnel 
to move materials to an RSY pad for screening. The soils on the RSY pad will be surveyed and sampled by The 
Contractor. Once the sample results are received, The Contractor shall categorize the material as (a) radiological 
waste, (b) chemical waste, (c) mixed waste, or (d) on-site backfill material. For waste cases (a), (b) and (c), The 
Contractor shall stockpile and or load waste materials into appropriate containers, stage materials for appropriate 
transportation and disposal pick-up, and transfer appropriate chemical and radiological waste categorization data to 
the appropriate Hunters Point Shipyard transportation and disposal contractors. The transportation and disposal 
contractors will be responsible for providing appropriate containers and moving the materials to their staging areas. 
For materials cleared for use as backfill (case (d)), The Contractor shall notifY the on-site radiological remediation 
contractor for pick-up of the material and provide all data associated with the clearance of the materials. The on-site 
radiological remediation contractor will be responsible for moving the material from the RSY, staging the backfill 
material, and using material as backfill near the excavation origin. 
Turnaround time for material screening in the RSY is expected to be no longer than 15 business days from the time 
of receipt of materials to the time materials are requested for pick-up with corresponding data packages. 
In addition to the requirement described above The Contractor shall perfonn the following under this work element: 
• Operate two RSYs at Hunters Point; currently, RSY-3 contains 10 screening pads; and RSY-4 contains 24 
screening pads and an equipment decontamination pad. 
• Post and manage the RSYs as Radiologically Controlled Areas (RCAs) in accordance with field work 
documents and The Contractor's NRC license. 
• Brief site workers on the California Air Resource Board regulation concerning "Asbestos Airborne Toxic 
Control Measures for Construction Sites." Although The Contractor shall not trigger the requirements of this 
regulation, we will comply with the substantive requirements identified in section (d) for "Road Construction 
and Maintenance." 
• Maintain wind socks at each RSY to detennine the prevailing wind direction to ensure proper placement of the 
radiological air monitoring equipment on a daily basis. 
• Install upwind and downwind air monitoring equipment for asbestos, PM 10, Total Suspended Particulate, lead, 
and magnesium to provide the Navy defensible data that no fugitive dust is being generated during RSY 
operations. 
• Provide specific worker training on how to identifY sandblast grit, bottles, jars, and/or other unidentified 
containers that may be found during removal actions. Iffound, Contractor shall immediately notifY the Navy 
and will follow the requirements outlined in the HPS Standard Operating Procedures. 
• Maintain storm water controls as identified in the Stonn Water Pollution Prevention Plan (SWPPP). 
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2.5.4.1 EXCAVATED SOIL TRANSFER 
The following procedures shall be followed during the transfer of soil to and from the RSY s; 
• The on-site radiological remediation contractor coordinate with The Contractor to determine which RSY will 
be used prior to excavation of soil and how much soil will be coming to the RSY from any one excavation 
area. 
• The on-site radiological remediation contractor field engineer supervising the excavation will complete a truck 
ticket containing pertinent information related to each truckload (e.g., trench segment identification and load 
numbers and screen pad identification numbers and unique stockpile identification number) which will be 
given to the driver prior to transporting the soil to the RSY. 
• All excavated soil transported to the designated RSY will be free of debris greater then 6-inches in size and no 
pipes or manholes will be transferred to the RSY. 
• The Contractor will segregate the soil appropriately per the information on the truck tickets. In addition, 
excavated soil that emits odors or is stained will be noted by the on-site radiological remediation contractor 
field engineer on the truck ticket and the field engineer will notifY the RSY contractor so that the material can 
be segregated prior to radiological scanning and sampling. 
• Upon arrival at the RSY, the driver will give the ticket to the RSY staff who will direct the driver to place his 
load of soil on the appropriate ofthe soil screening pads. 
• All trucks entering the RSY will be covered. 
• The on-site radiological remediation contractor performing excavations is responsible for informing the RSY 
operator that no more soil will be generated from a given IR site or Work Area so that clearing operations may 
begin. 
• The on-site radiological remediation contractor performing excavations is responsible for performing the 
chemical sampling of excavated soil for IR contaminants. This activity will be coordinated with the RSY 
contractor. 
2.5.4.2 RSY SCREENING PAD SURVEYS 
The current typical operation of the RSYs is described in the following bullets; 
• Once a screening pad is determined to be ready, surveys of excavated materials on the pads (not to exceed 
1,000 m2) will be initiated. The surveys will be performed as a MARSSIM final status survey to clear the 
materials for reuse as backfill. The surveys will include a 100% scan of the soil surface, static readings at 
predetermined systematic sampling locations, and additional static readings at biased sample locations. 
Samples will be taken and forwarded to the on-site laboratory for analysis. The soil will remain on the pad 
pending receipt of sample analysis. 
• The soils will only be used as backfill after Navy confirms that the results of the radiological surveys and 
sampling activities confirm that no contamination is present above the action levels. 
• Should radioactive materials be present above the RROs in any sample collected from a RSY, The Contractor 
may take additional samples to better define the area for remediation of pad materials as waste. If the majority 
of samples indicate radioactive materials above the RROs, it may be necessary to waste the entire pad. 
• The Contractor is responsible for processing the soil and receiving Navy concurrence on the release of the soil 
for use as backfill. 
• The Contractor will stage the cleared material and notifY on-site remediation contractors that it is available for 
use as backfill material. 
• Any chemically contaminated material that is radiologically cleared, will be stockpiled on 20-mil HDPE by 
the RSY contractor and the RPM will be notified to coordinate handling. 
• lfthe soil is free-released, it will be stockpiled outside ofthe RSY; if the soil is radiologically contaminated or 
designated as chemical/solid and radiological contamination, it will be disposed of appropriately by the 
Navy's radiological waste contractor. The Contractor will communicate with appropriate on-site contractors 
as to when each stockpile becomes available for use as backfill or is to be disposed of as LLRW and track on 
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all such infonnation in the database. Because each truckload and each stockpile is carefully tracked through 
the data management system, on-site radiological remediation contractors will be able to backfill the soil 
generally within the same area from which it was excavated. 
2.5.5 WASTE MATERIAL MANAGEMENT 
The Waste Management section in the Base-wide Radiological Work Plan and the Base-wide Sewers and Stann 
Drain Work Plan provides guidelines for waste handling. Changes to this general approach may be recommended 
by the Contractor but will require Navy approval before implementation. However, regulatory requirements for 
waste management referenced in the Base-wide Sewers and Storm Drain Work Plan may not be changed. 
2.5.5.1 RADIOLOGICAL/MIXED WASTE 
Radiological and mixed wastes (contains both hazardous waste as defined by RCRA and its amendments, and 
radioactive waste as defined by AEA and its amendments) are to be properly characterized and stored for disposal. 
Bins required for bulk storage of radiological/mixed wastes will be provided by the Navy LLRW Program on-site 
waste management contractor. Coordination between The Contractor and the on-site waste management contractor 
will be required. Assume sampling for waste characterization will be perfonned by the waste management 
contractor. Coordination efforts with the Navy RPM, RASO, Anny Joint Munitions Command (DoD LLRW 
Executive Agency responsible for contracting for the Navy LLRW Program) and the radiological waste contractor 
will be required. The Contractor will coordinate with the waste management contractor and ensure appropriate 
radiological waste handling procedures are conducted within their controlled radiological work area. The Contractor 
will prepare a waste infonnation sheet for each waste source detailing the existing analytical infonnation available 
or expected to be generated for each waste storage unit (drum, bin, etc.) as well as infonnation on the wastes (source 
area, filed instrument readings, on site laboratory results, etc.). Currently procurement of the containers, manifesting, 
transportation and disposal is all arranged by the waste management contractor. Once waste is properly identified 
and placed in waste containers, it will be transferred to the waste management contractor. Pending transfer to the 
waste management contractor, the radiological/mixed waste is to be stored under a broad scope license authority. 
After transfer, it will be stored under the waste management contractor's license authority until transported to an 
appropriate waste disposal facility. All applicable NFECSW Environmental Work Instructions regarding low level 
radiological waste are to be observed. 
2.5.5.2 NON-RADIOLOGICAL WASTES 
Waste management, characterization sampling, stockpiling, and storage are covered under this contract. The Base-
wide Radiological Work Plan and the Base-wide Sewers and Storm Drain Work Plan document the difference 
between IRP and non IRP site soil and waste material handling processes. These guidelines remain in effect. Final 
off-site transportation and disposal of soil and debris wastes shall be managed under a separate base-wide chemical 
waste transportation and disposal contract. These efforts will be associated with non-radioactive waste generated 
under this SOW. All construction debris and chemical waste material are to be stockpiled or packaged in appropriate 
containers and staged in approved areas. Coordination efforts between the base-wide transportation and disposal 
Contractor, the CSO and the ROICC shall be required. 
SECTION 3- SPECIAL CONDITIONS 
3.1 "Section 2912 of the FY 1994 Defense Authorization Act (Pub. L. 103-160) establishes the following 
preference for business located in the vicinity of base closure and alignment work: 
(a) Preference required - In entering into contracts with private entities as part of the base closure or 
realignment of a military installation under a base closure law, the Secretary of Defense shall give 
preference, to the greatest extent practicable, to qualified businesses located in the vicinity of the 
installation and to small business concerns and small disadvantaged business concerns. Contracts for 
which this preference shall be given shall include contracts to carry out activities for the environmental 
restoration and mitigation at military installations to be closed or realigned." 
DFARS Subpart 226.71 and 226.72 implement the requirements of Section 2912 of the FY 1994 Defense 
Authorization Act. 
"Section 817 of the 1994 Defense Authorization Act ) Pub L. 103-337) authorizes the Secretary of 
Defense to give preference to entities that plan to hire local residents when entering into contracts for 
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services to be performed at a military installation that is affected be closure or management under a base 
closure law." 
DFARS Subpart 226.7104 implements the requirements of Section 817 of the FY 1995 Defense 
Authorization Act) Pub. L. 103-337). DFARS 226.7104 states: 
"When planning for contracts for services related to base closure activities at a military installation 
affected by a closure or realignment under a base closure law, contracting officers shall consider, 
including, as a factor in source selection, the extent to which offerors specifically identifY and commit, in 
their proposals, to a plan to hire residents in the vicinity of the limitary installation that is being closed or 
realigned." 
The Government hereby makes it a condition of this award that the prime Contractor shall abide by the 
federal laws mentioned herein. The prime Contractor shall provide an explanation of all efforts and 
results to award subcontracts and hire personnel within the vicinity of Hunters Point Naval Shipyard, San 
Francisco, California. Vicinity, as defined in this award, refers to the following three postal zip codes: 
94124,94134, and 94107. 
3.2 All requirements of the basic contract, in addition to those specifically mentioned in this scope of work, 
remain in full effect and performance. 
3.3 Minutes of regulatory agency, Navy and/or Activity meetings shall be submitted to the RPM, CS and 
activity Point-of Contact (POC) within ten (I 0) calendar days after each meeting. 
3.4 Public Affairs- The Contractor shall not disclose any data resulting from action in this contract to the news 
media or public. The Contractor shall refer all press or public contacts to the Activity POC and shall notifY 
the RPM of their actions. The Contractor may not distribute reports or data to any other source, unless 
specifically authorized by the Public Affairs Officer in accordance with NA VF AC Instruction. 
3.5 Any oral directions, instructions, explanations, commitments and/or acceptances given by any government 
employee to the Contractor or his personnel shall not be construed by the Contractor as a scope change to 
this proposal scope of work. Only the Contracting Officer has the authority to issue any change in SOW to 
the Contractor, and scope changes shall be issued in writing. 
3.6 The Contractor shall provide copies of all correspondence to the RPM and Contract Specialist. 
3. 7 The Contractor shall make every effort to prevent the spread of contamination or release of contaminants to 
the environment in accordance with federal, state, and local laws, regulations and instructions. 
3.8 Forward all deliverables to the NFECSW RPM. A copy of the deliverables transmittal letter shall also be 
forwarded to the Contract Specialist. 
3.9 The Contractor's cost proposal format shall be in accordance with the cost estimate format provided in 
Section 4- Government Furnished Data, enclosure ( 1 ). 











GENERAL REFERENCE DOCUMENTS 
Installation Restoration Chemical Data Quality Manual (IRCDQM), NFESC, 1999 
EPA Requirements for QAPP for Environmental Data Operations, EPA QA/R-5, 200 I 
Guidance Systematic Planning Using the Data Quality Objectives Process, EPA QA/G-4, EPA 2006 
DoD Quality System Manual for Environmental Laboratories, Version 4.1, Apri12009 
EPA Uniform Federal Policy for Quality Assurance Project Plans, March 2005 
SOUTHWESTNA VF ACENGCOMINST 51 OO.l.A of February 1995 
20 CFR 1910.120 (Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response) 
EM 385-1-1 Us Army Corps of Engineers Safety and Health Requirements 
Manual Navy/Marine Corps Installation Restoration Program Manual 
Page 15 of21 
4.2 PROJECT SPECIFIC DOCUMENTS 
4.2.1 Local Activity safety plans and standard operating procedure 
4.2.2 Hunters Point Historical Radiological Assessment, Vol 2, August, 2004 
4.2.3 Basewide Radiological Removal Action Memorandum, Hunters Point Shipyard, San Francisco, California, 
Revision 2006 
4.2.4 Base-Wide Radiological Work Plan Revision 1, October, 2007 
4.2.5 Final Project Work Plan, Revision 2, Base-wide Storm Drain and Sanitary Sewer Removal, Hunters Point 
Shipyard, San Francisco, California, June 2008. 
4.2.6 Survey Unit Project Report Abstract for the Sanitary Sewer and Storm Drain Removal Project, Hunters 
Point Shipyard, San Francisco, California, July 2008. 
4.2.7 Field Sampling Plans and Quality Assurance Project Plans, Sampling and Analysis Plan (Field Sampling 
Plan and Quality Assurance Project Plan) Revision 4 October 9, 2009. 
SECTION 5- GOVERNMENT FURNISHED DATA: 
5.1. CD ROM ENCLOSURE(S) 
(1) Project Specific Reference Documents: Hunters Point Historical Radiological Assessment, Vol 2, August, 2004, 
Base-wide Radiological Removal Action Memorandum, Hunters Point Shipyard, San Francisco, California, 
Revision 2006, Base-Wide Radiological Work Plan Revision 1, October, 2007, Final Project Work Plan, 
Revision 2, Base-wide Storm Drain and Sanitary Sewer Removal, Hunters Point Shipyard, San Francisco, 
California, June 2008. Survey Unit Project Report Abstract for the Sanitary Sewer and Storm Drain 
Removal Project, Hunters Point Shipyard, San Francisco, California, July 2008. Field Sampling Plans and 
Quality Assurance Project Plans, Sampling and Analysis Plan (Field Sampling Plan and Quality 
Assurance Project Plan) Revision 4 October 9, 2009. 
(2) Project Drawings/Maps: Hunters Point RSY Location Map, Hunters Point Autocad dwg 
(3) Project Specifications: Laboratory Analysis On Site, and Of-Site 
5.2. PRICING SCHEDULE 
SECTION 6- POINTS-OF-CONTACT 
Lead Remedial Project Melanie Kito, P .E. 
BRAC PMO West 
Phone: (619)532-0787 
1455 Frazee Road, Suite 900 
Manager (RPM) (BPMOW.MK) 
San CA 92108 
Fax: (619)532-0995 
Cindy Mafara 
BRAC PMO West 
Phone: ( 619)532-0978 
Contract Specialist (CS) 1455 Frazee Road, Suite 900 (RAQB02.CK) 




Field Team Caretaker Site Office 
Mel Asuncion 
Resident Officer in Charge of 
Office:( 51 0)749-5939 
Construction (ROICC) Shirley Ng 
Mobile:( 51 0)755-5878 
Radiological Affairs Support 
Laurie Lowman Phone: (757) 887-7644 
Office 
Commanding Officer, Attn: Code [EVR.NA] 
Naval Facilities Engineering Command Phone: ( 619) 532-2540 
Quality Assurance Officer Nars Ancog Southwest DSN: 522-2540 
(QAO) 1220 Pacific Highway Fax: (619) 532-1195 
San Diego, California 92132-5100 
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SECTION 7 - DELIVERABLE SCHEDULE MATRIX 
RPM RASO ROICC/CS Corresponding On Site 
sow (#of bard (#-of bard 0 Regulatory Radiological remediation 
Reference copies/ copies/ (#of bard Agency(ies) contractors 
Item Paragnpb(s electronic electronic copies! e- (# of bard (#of bard copies! eleclronic 
Number Ddinrsblc ) copies) copies)) copies) copies/ disks) copies)) Due Date 
I Momhly Progress Sect1on 2 I 0/1 Oil 0/l 010 010 Concurrent with monthly m\oJce 
Reports and ossuance 
Schedule Update> 




3 Da:lr FJeld Secuon 2.1 0/1 011 0/l 010 U/0 2 \\Orlong days following field 
Reports actn'ttles 









6 Planning Stttion 2.4 1/ 1 l /1 0/1 0/0 0/0 45 days after kick off meeting 




7 Planning Section 2.4 1/3 Il l 0/1 10ns 0/1 45 days after issui.ng Draft 
Documents (For Tasks 
(Fin als) 2.4.1.1 
through 
2.4.1.6) 
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RPM RASO ROICOCS Corresponding On Site 
sow (# of bard (#of bard 0 Regulatory Radiological remediation 
Reference copies/ copies/ (#of hard Agency(ies) contractors 
Item Paragraph(s electronic dectronic copies/e-. (##of hard (# of bard cop.ies/ electronic 
Number Deliverable -) copies) copjes}} copies) copies/ disks) copies)) Doe Date 
8 La b Analytical Section 2.5 0/1 0/1 oro 0/0 1/ 1 10 working days afler receipt of 
D'dta Packages samples 
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SECTION 8 - PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT AND PAYMENT SUMMARY 
Within the table the tasks have been rolled up under each Work Element so as to avoid repetit ion of the 
text. Performance measurement and payment will however be made at the task level. The Contractor's 
proposal and Invoice shall therefore be broken out by task. 
Wort( Element Acceptable Assessment Performance Payment and 
/Task Performance St-andard Quality Level Method Incentive 
Section 2.1 Accurate and timely cost and Subjective Navy performance Ltmlp sum payable monthly as a 
(Task 1- schedule management. evaluations percentage of completion of each 
Project Accurate and timely met:ling task. 
Management) support. CPARS. 
Section 2.2 Attendees are prompt and 100% on Navy receipt or Lump sum payable pro-rated as a 
(Task 2- nppropriatt: ly prepared to promptness: Contrl!clor- percentage of meeting completion 
Project meetings and presentations. subjective on prepared minutes schedule upon Navy acceptance of 
Me-etingS) preparation within 10 days of the meeting minutes. 
meeting when 
required by SOW: 
Navy feedback 
Section 2.3 Completion of procw·ernenl Su~jective Navy perfor111ance Lump sum payable monthly as a 
(Task 3- activities, mobilization ef'lorts, eval\tations percentage of completion of .each 
Projt:cl utilities coordination. Maintain task. 
Infrastructure) a clean and secure work site. CPAR. 
Mobili7.e and demobili7..c 
personnel with minimal 
impacts on base operations 
ongoir1g outside Contmctor·s 
scope. 
Section 2.4 Navy acceptance of IOO%Navy Navy acceptance Lump sum payable us a 
(Task 4- deliverables (no rcsubmittal acceptance by Contracting percentage of completion through 
Plannh1g required due to inadequate Ofticcr (KO) or submission of deliverdbles to 
Documents) content or poor quality). Remedial Project Navy with the following 
The execution plan, to include Manager (RPM); milestone limits in r.he payment 
SSHP. and all sections and acceptance by schedule: 30% of the proposed 
appendices shall include RASO. ROICC. task cost at distribution of 
suflicient in fom1ation to CSO. and internal draft.. 30% of task cost 
implement the mobilization or NMCPI-IC. upon acceptance and distribution 
equipment and personnel, Concurrence by of craft docLm1ent by KO or RPM. 
excavate and remove U1c sewer BCTwill also RASO. ROICC. CSO. and 
and storm drain pipes, wo:igh in. NMC'PHC, and 40% or task cost 
demolition of buildings. sitl! upon acceptance and distribution 
preparntion, perform the or final document by KO, RPM, 
appropriate sampling and and PFA signatories· as applicable. 
surveying, clear the appropriate 
materia) and trenches, record 
and maintain appropriate data 
in support of site close out, 
back lill trenches. and 
demobilize when complete. 
The planning documents must 
be clearly written. and have 
minimal transcript ion, 
typograph ic<~!. and grammatical 
errors. The SSHP. A HAs. and 
II PPs must be accepted hy 
13RAC PMO. NFECSW, 
NMCPHC. lind comply with all 
applicable codes, standards. 
and regulations (including the 
NCP). 
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Work Element Acccptuble Assessment Performance Puymcnt and 
/ Task Performance Standard Oualitv Level Method lnccntive 
Section 2.5 Navy acceptance of on site 100% Navy Navy acceptance Prorated costs of laboratory 
(Site Support support operations to include: acceptance l)y Contracting analyses and radjological 
Activi ties) -timely support lor bascwide Om cor (KO) or screening yard based on number 
radiological Lraining and Remedial Project and type of analytical samples 
implementation or radiological Manager (RPM) processed and volume of material 
controls and RASO; processed through RSY. 
-EI1icient laboratory support acceptance by 
for on site contmctors. ROIC'C' and CSO. 
~:omplyi ng with the SAP, and Spot visits by 
meeting project QA/QC Navy. review of 
objectives. field logs and 
-Efliclent processing of manifest sheets. 
radiological and chemical 
waste mat.erial through 
screening yard and waste 
munilesting proce~s. Accurate 
and timely transportution und 
disposal of waste material from 
site. 
Faclors that inllucnce Navy 
acceptance include timel iness, 
completeness and accuracy. 
Manifests shull conform to the 
report requirements outlined in 
the sow" be clearly written: 
and have minimaltnmscription. 
typographical, and grammatical 
errors. 
F.nvironmenlal considerations. 
in pmticular dusl mitigation 
and SWI'Pl' measures must be 
adequately maintained al all 
times. 
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SECTION 9- PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS AND PAYMENT 
9.1 The contractor shall be responsible for achieving the performance objectives in this Performance Work 
Statement (PWS) and successfully performing all the intermediate tasks required for successful 
performance. Incentive payments shall be made based on achievement of performance of selected 
performance objectives in the Performance Requirements Summary (PRS). Performance objectives are 
also referred to as performance milestones in this PWS. The contractor shall propose a Performance 
Milestone Schedule that demonstrates understanding of objectives and challenges to successful 
performance with a target completion date proposed of8 months from date of award. Ifthe proposed 
completion date is scheduled beyond 8 months from date of award, a thorough explanation shall be 
provided. 
9.2 Payments shall be made to the contractor upon completion ofthe following: 
1) Verification that the corresponding performance standards and AQLs have been satisfactorily 
achieved, and 
2) Submission of a properly prepared invoice. Invoices that fail to meet the requirements of this 
paragraph and/or the invoicing or prompt payment clauses of the contract may be rejected in their 
entirety; partial payments shall not be made. The Milestone Schedule may be revised only by written 
agreement of the Contracting Officer. 
9.2.1 If the work associated with performance milestones is eliminated or not necessary for accomplishing 
project completion, the payment amount associated with the performance milestone shall be paid to 
contractor upon achieving the performance standards of the next performance milestone in the 
Performance Milestone Schedule. 
9.2.2 Failure to demonstrate that the remedy is operating properly and successfully to achieve the site remedial 
action objectives may result in non-payment of the final milestone. 
9.3 BASE BID ITEM: Firm Fixed Price (Lump Sum) including all labor, equipment, and materials for 
Remedial Design and Remedial Action Installation Restoration Hunters Point Base-wide Radiological 
Support at the Hunters Point Shipyard San Francisco, California The proposal is to be submitted as 
shown in the pricing schedule below: 
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PRIC ING SCHEDULE 
FIRM FIXED PRIC E WORK 
CLIN DESCRIPTION QUANTITY UNIT UNIT PRICE TOTAL 
2. 1 Project Management, a nd Administrative 8 MO $ s 
Support 
2.2.2 BCT Meetings 2 EA $ $ 
2.2.3 Contractor Communication and 8 MO $ $ 
Coot·dination 
Contractor integration meetings I EA $ $ 
2.3 Project Infrastructure 8 MO $ $ 
2.5.1 On Site Contingency Work - provide 8 MO $ $ 
radiological screening support to other 
contractors include operating portal monitors 
2.5.2 Off Site Contingency Wor k - to respond to 8 MO $ $ 
address Navy off s ite response action provide 
radiological/chemical screening support to 
avy 
2.5.3.1 On Site Radiological laboratory 8 MO $ $ 
2.5.3.2 Off Site L:tboratory Support 8 MO $ $ 
2.5.4 Radiological Screening Yard 8 MO $ $ 
2.5.5 Waste Material Management 8 MO $ $ 
TOTALFFP $ 
All quantities are estimated for purposes of evaluation. Payments shall be made for actual work performed and 


















Page 1 of 1 
Subj: Conveyor system description revised 
Date: 4/21/2006 2:22:50 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time 
From: kbradley@newworld.org 
To: bertb@newworld.org, bertbowers@aol.com 
Monday, May 15,2017 AOL: BERTBOWERS 
The referenced conveyor system supported with attached pictures utilizes a "Grizzly" 
vibrating hopper, several conveyor belts to move soiVsmall debris, and an array of 6 GM 
detectors for beta/gamma detection and 6 sodium iodide detectors for gamma detection 
which are connected to a laptop computer to display real-time count information. 
Soil is loaded into the grizzly, which separates large rocks that can be surveyed 
individually from the soiVsmall debris. The soil continues on the conveyor, passing under 
the detector array to be monitored by the HP Technician assigned to the computer 
readout. When radioactive material is detected, an alarm shows on the computer and the 
belt is stopped. A manual survey is performed to confirm/isolate the contamination which 
is then removed and the system is restarted to continue stockpiling the surveyed "clean" 
material. 
From: Kenneth Bradley 
Sent; ffi 6/2/2006 12:33 PM 
To: ~~n Polyak 
Cc .5oe.u 3cwers; Justin Hubbard 
SUbject: 
Monday, May 15, 2017 AOL: BERTBOWERS 
General conveyor facts -
• No procedure exists in NWT for the operation of the conveyor system. 
• There is no set frequency to check the belt speed. 
• There is no "training" for the system or the belt. All knowledge is passed on by 
"experienced" people. 
• Based on interviews with technicians/supervisors, from the beginning of the 
project, Tetra Tech supervision (I was told Bill Williams) stated that the conveyor 
belt was "equipment" that technicians were not allowed to operate except to stop 
for an alarm. 
Facts about the PCB conveyor-
• The generator was reinstalled in the area after Christmas shutdown on Feb 13, 
2006 
• There is no evidence the belt speed was checked after the generator was installed. 
• There is no record of when the speed was last checked. 
• All 2x2 alarm setpoints are right. All GM setpoints have been raised by 2. 
• HP's working the conveyor believe that the belt speed is Tetra Tech's 
responsibility. 
Recommendations for conveyor operations -
• Through discussions wiTT, establish clear responsibility for conveyor operations. 
Belt speed is as important to us as detector height or alarm setpoints. We MUST 
control this and be allowed to stop operations when a certain variance is 
exceeded. 
• The need for a procedure for setup and operation is paramount. Operations 
cannot be left to memory or "tribal knowledge". 
• Training must be conducted. Knowledge and understanding of these systems vary 


















From: Abkemeier, Erik  
Sent: Tuesday, May 04, 2010 9:18 AM 
To: Bowers, Bert 






Erik Abkemeier CHP PE CSP CHMM| Corporate Health Physics Manager  
Direct: 757.466.4906 | Fax: 757.461.4148 | Cell: 757.944.0921  
erik.abkemeier@tetratech.com  
  
Tetra Tech EC | ESQ  
Twin Oaks, Suite 309, 5700 Lake Wright Drive | Norfolk, VA 23502 | www.tetratech.com  
  
PLEASE NOTE:  This message, including any attachments, may include confidential and/or inside information. Any distribution or 
use of this communication by anyone other than the intended recipient is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you are not the 
intended recipient, please notify the sender by replying to this message and then delete it from your system.  
 Think Green - Not every email needs to be printed. 
 
From: Bolt, Andrew  
Sent: Friday, April 23, 2010 6:02 PM 
To: Abkemeier, Erik; Charette, Jessica 
Cc: Dougherty, Bill 


















From: Dougherty, Bill  
Sent: Friday, April 23, 2010 2:30 PM 
To: Bolt, Andrew 







Bill Dougherty | Project Manager  
Direct: 415.216.2731 | Cell: 415.238.7006  
bill.dougherty@tetratech.com  
  
Tetra Tech | Remediation  
200 Fisher Avenue | San Francisco, CA 94124 | www.tetratech.com  
  
PLEASE NOTE:  This message, including any attachments, may include confidential and/or inside information. Any distribution or 
use of this communication by anyone other than the intended recipient is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you are not the 
intended recipient, please notify the sender by replying to this message and then delete it from your system.  
 Think Green - Not every email needs to be printed. 
 
From: Miller, Thorpe  
Sent: Friday, April 23, 2010 2:16 PM 
To: Dougherty, Bill 
Cc: Dougherty, Christine 


































Thorpe Q. Miller | Radiological Data Analyst  
Direct: 415.216.2773 | Main: 415.671.1990 | Fax: 415.671.1995 | Cell: 415.405.5088  
Thorpe.Miller@tetratech.com  
  
Tetra Tech EC Inc. | ESQ  
200 Fisher Ave. | San Francisco, CA 94124 | www.tetratech.com  
  
PLEASE NOTE:  This message, including any attachments, may include confidential and/or inside information. Any distribution or 
use of this communication by anyone other than the intended recipient is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you are not the 
intended recipient, please notify the sender by replying to this message and then delete it from your system.  




















From: Miller, Thorpe  
Sent: Thursday, January 06, 2011 7:24 AM 
To: Berry, Adam; Bowers, Bert; Bray, Jeff; Chiu, George; Dougherty, Christine; Hanif, Chris; Hubbard, 
Justin; Kanaya, Rich; Keenan, Daniel; McWade, Dennis; Miller, Thorpe; Montgomery, Shanti; Rolfe, 
Stephen; Weingarz, Richard; White, Bryan; Crabtree, Allen; Ho, Sam; Lai, Timothy; Pena, Luis 







Trench Work ES IR Estimated Adjusted Remediated Estimated Cleared 
Unit Area Unit # Site Yards3 Yards3 Yards3 Yards3 Backfill 
187 UC3 0307 00 324 243 2 241 17-Nov-10 
16 0309 00 300 225 7 218 17-Nov-10 
0318 00 140 105 0 105 25-Oct-10 




















































































From: Miller, Thorpe  
Sent: Thursday, January 06, 2011 1:09 PM 
To: Crabtree, Allen; Ho, Sam; Lai, Timothy; Pena, Luis; Berry, Adam; Bowers, Bert; Bray, Jeff; Chiu, 
George; Dougherty, Christine; Hanif, Chris; Hubbard, Justin; Kanaya, Rich; Keenan, Daniel; McWade, 
Dennis; Miller, Thorpe; Montgomery, Shanti; Rolfe, Stephen; Weingarz, Richard; White, Bryan 







Trench Work ES IR Estimated Adjusted Remediated Estimated Cleared 
Unit Area Unit # Site Yards3 Yards3 Yards3 Yards3 Backfill 
190 UC3 0312 00 300 225 1 224 17-Nov-10 
16 0317 00 300 225 0 225 25-Oct-10 
Total 600 450 1 449 
Imported Mills Peninsula Hospital soil will be utilized for additional cubic yardage (est. 186 yd3) given the project 
requirement for a final compacted soil layer. Please keep the Data Group informed on a daily basis as to the actual 
quantity used in backfilling the trench and the quantity left over to be used in a different trench unit in the future if 
applicable. 
Thank you, 
Thorpe Q. Miller | Data Manager  
Direct: 415.216.2773 | Main: 415.671.1990 | Fax: 415.671.1995 | Cell: 415.710.3096  
Thorpe.Miller@tetratech.com  
IO Environmental & Infrastructure, Inc. | Hunters Point Shipyard  
2840 Adams Ave. | San Diego, CA 92116 | www.ioenvironmental.com  
PLEASE NOTE: This message, including any attachments, may include confidential and/or 
inside information. Any distribution or use of this communication by anyone other 
than the intended recipient is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you are 
not the intended recipient, please notify the sender by replying to this message and 
then delete it from your system.  
 Think Green ‐ Not every email needs to be printed. 
 
‐‐‐‐‐Original Message‐‐‐‐‐ 
From: Jensen, Jarvis K CIV SEA 04, 04NR [mailto:jarvis.jensen@navy.mil]  
Sent: Thursday, January 06, 2011 1:05 PM 
To: DeLong, Daryl; Lowman, Laurie L CIV SEA 04 04N; Slack, Matthew L CIV SEA 04 04N; 
Owens, Patrick A CIV SEA 04 04N; Edwards, Zachary L CIV SEA 04 04N; Stambaugh, Allen 
R CIV SEA 04, 04N 
Cc: Henderson, Brian; Dougherty, Bill; Dougherty, Christine; Miller, Thorpe; Bray, 
Jeff; Weingarz, Richard; Chiu, George 
Subject: RE: HPS Data ‐ Parcel UC3 Sewer Trench Unit 190 (TO03) 
Daryl, 
I have reviewed the Survey Unit 190 Project Report. I concur with backfilling the 
trench. 
Jarvis 
Jarvis Jensen 
NAVSEADET RASO 
Yorktown Naval Weapons Station 
(757) 887‐4483 
jarvis.jensen@navy.mil 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‐‐‐‐‐Original Message‐‐‐‐‐ 
From: DeLong, Daryl [mailto:daryl.delong@tetratech.com]  
Sent: Thursday, December 02, 2010 4:02 PM 
To: Jensen, Jarvis K CIV SEA 04, 04NR; Lowman, Laurie L CIV SEA 04 04N; Slack, 
Matthew L CIV SEA 04 04N; Owens, Patrick A CIV SEA 04 04N; Edwards, Zachary L CIV SEA 
04 04N; Stambaugh, Allen R CIV SEA 04, 04N 
Cc: Henderson, Brian; Dougherty, Bill; Dougherty, Christine; Miller, Thorpe; Bray, 
Jeff; Weingarz, Richard; Chiu, George 
Subject: HPS Data ‐ Parcel UC3 Sewer Trench Unit 190 (TO03) 
Attached for your review is the Internal Draft Survey Unit 190 Project Report and 
Attachments 1 through 5, 7, and 8. Attachment 6 is QA data and is not available at 
this time. We would like concurrence to backfill the trench. 
Daryl DeLong | Consulting Health Physicist  
Direct: 415.216.2734 | Main: 415.671.1990 | Fax: 415.671.1995 | Cell: 415.308.7027  
Daryl.Delong@tetratech.com  
RSRS | Health Physics  
200 South Virginia St. Suite 800 | Reno, NV 89501 | www.radsvcs.com  
PLEASE NOTE: This message, including any attachments, may include confidential and/or 
inside information. Any distribution or use of this communication by anyone other 
than the intended recipient is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you are 
not the intended recipient, please notify the sender by replying to this message and 
then delete it from your system.  
P Think Green ‐ Not every email needs to be printed. 
 
